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This body of research seeks to understand iterations of ranting manifest via 
YouTube video blogs through a rhetorical lens. I employ comparative theory to 
develop a description of the rant as a recurring typology, equipped with excremental 
metaphors inspired by Burke’s concept of catharsis. I then differentiate YouTube vlog 
ranting from ‘live’ ranting by applying Carolyn Miller’s theory of genre as social 
action. Using Miller’s paradigm, I turn to contemporary research in media studies and 
humor communication, in order to develop a methodology equipped to analyze 
YouTube vlog rants as generic texts. I contend that the meaning constructed in 
YouTube vlogs must be interpreted beyond the oral performance of the rant, and 
explicate a methodological approach that accounts for editing, camera positioning 
(confessional-style format), scripting, setting, and any other superfluous additions that 
exists outside of the diegetic action of the vlog. In the culminating chapter of the 
exposition, I provide a preliminary application of the method. I also discuss the social 
implications of comedic vlog rants, and suggest that YouTube vlogging creates a 
unique subject position for the vlogger; a subject position that enables greater social 
influence and the potential for celebrity status. I conclude by questioning what role this 
subject positioning might play in reinforcing or subverting heteronormativity – based 
on a hypothesis that adherence to hegemonic ideals surrounding gender and sexuality is 
positively correlated with popularity (and participation in revenue sharing). 
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Vrooman (2002), in his summary about ranting online, claimed that cyberspace, 
“is a performative space, a space created through programming and communicative 
interaction. This is a place where all sorts of performances occur […] It is a kind of 
playground of identity where performance is the modus operandi (Plotz and Bell, 1996)” 
(p. 52). This study is concerned with a particular type of performance – the rant, on a 
particular online platform - YouTube. Ranting online occurs in a “performative space,” 
that is a kind of “playground of identity.” A faction of YouTube users utilize the 
platform’s available tools to create and disseminate videos of themselves, and some of 
these recordings are video blogs that feature users speaking directly into the camera in a 
‘confessional-style’ whilst ‘ranting’ in a comedic way. In performing comedic vlog rants 
persistently on YouTube, vloggers create a persona. This means that ranters have the 
ability to make millions of people laugh while simultaneously developing an online 
identity through performance. Since laughter is both cathartic (Burke, 1959) and a 
unifying social principle (Burke, 1959; Meyer, 2000), it stands to reason that YouTube 
vloggers could potentially use the online identities they create to accomplish a variety of 
social actions (Ledbetter, 2014; Simonsen, 2012; Werner, 2012). That being said, this 
analysis simply aims to develop a working theory of the rant in order to examine how 
comedic ranting via vlog constructs a cathartic experience for the audience - one that 
depends upon how a performance is mediated and where this mediation emerges - as well 
	   2	  
as to offer an approach to analyzing a cultural artifact (The YouTube vlog) that combines 
rhetorical theory and media studies. 
This study proposes that locating rants in particular ‘rhetorical situations’ first 
requires a comprehensive description of ranting as a typology – after all, speech acts have 
been labeled ‘rants’ since the dawn of Western civilization. That the act of ranting is 
consistently and repeatedly performed in a variety of contexts is significant to this body 
of research for a number of reasons. Campbell and Jamieson (1978) explain:  
A genre is a classification based on the fusion and interrelation of elements in 
such a way that a unique kind of rhetorical act is created. Approaching such acts 
generically gives the critic a unique opportunity to penetrate their internal 
workings and to appreciate the interacting forces that create them. (p. 21)  
Delineating the rant as a rhetorical genre is an attempt to ‘penetrate’ the ‘internal 
workings’ of a rhetorical act that persists. However, examining iterations of the rant 
reinforces the disparity between recurring types of rhetoric on the one hand, and an 
identifiable rhetorical genre on the other. For example, the eulogy is often cited as one 
example of a rhetorical genre (Campbell & Jamieson, 1978; Miller, 1984; Lange, 2015), 
due to both its formal and substantive characteristics, as well as its emergence as an act in 
response to a particular, recurring situation; the act commemorates someone with whom 
one is close, while the situation might be that the person has retired, either from their job 
or in death. In some instances the eulogy may even celebrate a person’s birthday or an 
achievement of some distinction or excellence. At any rate, the occasion that brings the 
eulogy into existence is readily identifiable – the genre honors a person – as is the form 
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and, to a lesser extent, the substance of the act. Rants, however, are a response to a 
variety of situations for a multitude of different reasons, and while the form and 
substance of ranting online has been described in detail by recent researchers examining 
computer-mediated communication (Vrooman, 2002; Lange, 2015; Werner, 2012), the 
impetus to rant online must be determined with the same degree of certainty as the 
motivation to eulogize has been, in order to situate online ranting as a rhetorical genre.  
 Though there are similarities between the form and the substance of both the 
eulogy and the rant (they are both monologues [form] that express emotions [substance]), 
more significant are the differences, and not only in form and substance. The most 
notable divergence between these two rhetorical acts is their exigency; the eulogy 
emerges in the situation of commemorating someone known, yet rants emerge 
indiscriminately, in a multitude of different contexts that are not as readily identifiable as 
“the need to honor someone.” This examination draws distinctions that emphasize that 
while rhetorical genre is a recurring type, a recurring type is not necessarily a rhetorical 
genre, unless it accomplishes a social action (Miller, 1984).  
The notion of genre is often a convoluted concept in academic research. Fusing 
rhetorical criticism with critical media studies simplifies the task that a number of 
researchers face when genre research and development occurs in multi-media 
environments. Yates and Orlikowski (1992) remark: 
The notion of communication media is used variously and inconsistently by 
different researchers in different studies. In particular, the concept of medium has 
often been confused with that of genre. Confusion arises when researchers 
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compare genres of communication (e.g. memos or bulletins) with communication 
media (e.g. electronic mail or fax). Genres, however, may be physically created, 
transmitted, and stored in various media. Thus, comparing memos with electronic 
mail, for example, confounds the concept of communication medium with that of 
communication genre. […] Although our notion of genre is clearly differentiated 
from that of medium, we recognize their interaction by positing that medium may 
play a role in both the recurrent situation and the form of the genre (p 310) 
Examining rhetorical genre means addressing the form, substance, and action of a 
particular rhetorical phenomenon. What makes studying ranting via vlog difficult is that 
vlog rants represent a situation of hierarchically embedded rhetorical acts – the act of 
ranting (which has a form, substance, and exigence) is manifest within the act of making 
a YouTube video (which also has a form, substance, and exigence). For example, I argue 
that confessional-style recordings - a reiterative form of audio-visual production and the 
primary format of YouTube video blogs - are a recurrent form of video production, and 
one wherein the rant recurs online. More specifically, I explain how the rhetorical act of 
comedic ranting is “physically created” and “stored” in a confessional style format, and 
how the act of making a video of oneself and uploading it to YouTube takes precedent 
over the oral articulation of the rant in this particular rhetorical situation. This means that 
I approach confessional-style videos (a form that that is significant in particular contexts 
and that, according to Simonsen (2012) and Werner (2012), is indicative of identity 
construction) through a rhetorical lense, and employ a methodology equipped to examine 
both visual and aural aspects of rant performance via vlog. In short – I see vlogs as texts, 
and interpret their meaning as such.  
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Meaning is of course a product of interpretation, and sometimes –
misinterpretation. A crucial issue that arises throughout the course of this examination 
lies in the various interpretations of the term “genre.” This study is centered around the 
development of a specific speech act, i.e., the rant, and involves situating that oral 
performance within a specific rhetorical situation in a particular form and with a specific 
substance. Ranting is an act that transforms as it manifests in various instantiations; face 
to face rants accomplish a different social action than confessional-style recordings of 
rants, and confessional-style rants are performed differently depending on where and how 
they are mediated; whether they are uploaded to the internet via YouTube, played during 
a news broadcast, viewed as part of a reality television program, or sent directly to a few 
friends, confessional style rant performance accomplishes different social actions 
depending on the where, why, how, when, and who of the recording. Since generic rants 
surface within various other media also categorized by genres, it is necessary to draw a 
distinction between genre study in the rhetorical sense and genre studies in the field of 
media studies.  
Genre theory that accounts for specific speech acts is based on the social action 
that the speech act is used to accomplish (Miller, 1984), but media genre theory is 
typically conceptualized differently. For example, ‘drama,’ ‘comedy,’ ‘documentary,’ 
‘horror,’ ‘action,’ and ‘romance’ are all familiar film genres, and while it could be argued 
that some genres, (‘horror’ for instance) are classified based upon the social action they 
might potentially achieve (insofar as horror films have struck fear into viewers en masse), 
it is not necessarily the case that film genres are named based upon what they hope to 
achieve in audience response. For example, not all films belonging to the horror genre are 
	   6	  
designed to cause fear; similarly, ‘action’ films aren’t classified based on inciting their 
viewers to action. In the film studies tradition, Shary (2004) describes genre study 
specific to audio-visual media, explaining that such examination “considers patterns, 
motifs, and trends across a spectrum of films that share a commonality, usually subject 
matter and theme, and further explores how the elements of a genre are manifested and 
change over time” (p. 11). What is often the case, then, is that the notion of genre in 
media studies (based on the subject matter and theme of the film as a text) gets conflated 
with the conceptual theory of genre outlined by rhetoricians. For example, Werner (2012) 
has described four sub-genres of the YouTube vlog: “confession,” “reaction,” “witness,” 
and “rant,” each based on the substance and form of the language within a specific vlog 
or set of vlogs.  The issue with this classification is his naming of the sub-genres. 
Applying rhetorical genre theory to video formats is not ill-informed, but labeling genres 
of video formats based solely on the verbal utterance is misleading, since there is much 
more to interpreting the vlog than a moniker derived from the partial substance of a vlog 
can describe. 
Furthermore, Werner’s (2012) definition of the vlog assumes that all vlogs are 
filmed in confessional-style format, and although he claims that the vlog is not actually a 
genre (a point I disagree with), he advances ‘genres’ of the vlog all the same. One 
subgenre named is the ‘confession,’ which seems rather obvious considering that he 
assumes all vlogs are confessional style recordings – raising the question as to whether or 
not all vlogs might be seen as some mode of confession. Another example that illustrates 
the difficulty in naming genres of the vlog based solely on the verbal act lies in his 
differentiation between rant videos and reaction videos. Since ranting is also a reaction, 
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especially according to his description of what constitutes a rant, and since both rants and 
reactions share a propensity for heightened displays of emotion (albeit different emotions, 
based on his examples of these types), it seems as though these ‘sub-genres’ he identifies 
might see significant overlap. Of course, genre overlap or merging is common amongst 
popular digital media. Using cinema as an example again, ‘docu-dramas’ or ‘romantic 
comedies,’ are unions, or subgenres, of broader genres. In a similar fashion, musical 
genres are often fused and renamed as broader classifications that have evolved, 
transforming their original state into something new or different, yet still named 
appropriately. For example, the fusion of ‘metal’ and ‘emo’ becomes ‘screamo;’ since the 
lead singers of metal bands typically scream, and since emo is short for emotional (with a 
dramatic “life is pain” connotation attached), and this emotional expression is typically 
articulated in woeful, tinny song; the fusion then becomes life is still pain but rather than 
whine about it I’ll scream. 
To be clear, I am not criticizing Werner (2012) for applying rhetorical genre 
theory to YouTube video blogs, as this is also my approach. The aforementioned 
discussion of genre is meant to highlight the importance of parsing the verbal/oral content 
of the vlog (itself a rhetorical act) from the actual recording, and attaching names 
accordingly; this implores that the researcher examine vlogs as a much richer and 
multifaceted object, and apply interpretive analysis as such. In other words, the oral act 
becomes part of the substance of the vlog, and must be analyzed as a partial product of 
the vlogging form, NOT as its chief organizing principle. In fact, that oral, recurring 
types are remediated in vlog form via performance enables a deeper understanding of 
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certain oral genres - particularly emotional ones - a point I elaborate on in subsequent 
chapters. 
Confessional style recordings occur across a spectrum of media (i.e., documentary 
films, reality television, news broadcasts, YouTube video blogs, etc.) and so they cannot 
be said to be the sole format of a specific genre, but manifest rather as a common style of 
camera positioning across genres. Shary’s description of film genre highlights “patterns, 
motifs, and trends” amongst a spectrum of films, and certain aspects of cinematography 
(camera positioning, for instance) are often repeated in a particular genre. For the 
purposes of this study, I will refer to confessional-style recordings as a predominant form 
of the YouTube video blog, distinct from the genre of the YouTube video blog insofar as 
A) not all video blogs utilize confessional style format exclusively in their execution, and 
B) other media utilize confessional style format. While differentiating between a media 
studies approach to genre and rhetorical genre development specific to speech acts is a 
necessary precursor to studying ranting via vlog, I do believe that Miller’s (1984) 
paradigm has the ability to situate the vlog as a genre of the YouTube platform. In 
combining her model with media studies research, I suggest that her theory of genre as 
social action applies not only to oral discourse, but to video blogs as well. In other words, 
I expand her paradigm to include audiovisual recordings (though this expansion is limited 
to vlogs). 
I operate under the assumption that ranting via YouTube vlog is a method of 
subject positioning that ensures (the ranter’s) separateness from, and ontological and 
ideological opposition to, the (subject) which they critique, which is an adaptation of 
Vrooman (2002). In establishing that ranting is a recurrent form culminating in an 
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essential experience (catharsis), and suggesting that it is a form of pure persuasion 
(Burke, 1969), I avoid the arduous task of situating the act of ranting in itself at particular 
points in history – rather, I stake the claim that the rant as a recurring type is best 
understood as located within the rhetorical situation of the body. I then argue that 
humorous ranting also achieves catharsis, but that it manifests in a specific (ridiculous) 
approach; that the ranter exhibits pride by elevating themselves above the subject, and 
that the substance of the rant must reveal subject x as deserving of ridicule, in order for 
the ranter to position his/herself as superior to the subject. Finally, I differentiate comedic 
ranting via vlog from humorous ranting in itself, and suggest that comedic ranting via 
vlog allows users to engage in a process of constructing a unique and potentially 
powerful subject positioning. The ability to achieve this subject positioning is partially 
due to the idiosyncrasies of the textual form of the vlog combined with the form and 
substance of the oral performance of the rant - both of which are subject to the 
affordances of the YouTube platform.  
In future research, I would like to use these findings as a foundation for 
pinpointing particular instances where the rhetorical situation of YouTube allows 
vloggers to utilize confessional-style vlog rants to affect social influence – both on and 
off line. In the discussion section of this exposition, I hint at whether or not ranting on 
YouTube could enable its users to either ascribe to, or engage in the subversion of, 
hegemonic ideals. That being said, drawing a direct correlation between vlog rant ‘x’ and 
any particular instance of social change (transcending ideologies surrounding gender and 
sexuality, for instance) is a different project entirely. The examination that ensues and 
any theories developed herein are intended to serve as a pre-cursor to subsequent studies 
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more adept at handling the complicated nature of audience effects research. The aim here 
is to construct a method to accomplish an in-depth rhetorical analysis of YouTube vlogs. 
In order to achieve this end, I synthesize rhetorical criticism to stipulate a methodology 
equipped to analyze video blogs wherein the performance of comedic ranting via vlog is 
the central focus.  
This study takes video blogs as its object, and more specifically, video blogs with 
a particular format (confessional style) and on a particular platform (YouTube). To 
understand why the rant is a persistent reiterative form, it is pertinent to first describe the 
act of ranting as separate from the act of comedic vlog ranting. Then, some flexible 
guidelines will be offered to account for the humorous form of the rant as a verbal tool. 
Next, a detailed description of the video blog, confessional style format, and the 
affordances of YouTube as a social media platform will be offered, so that a more in-
depth understanding of how ranting functions (in form, substance, and social action) 
within these various mediated situations can be articulated. Finally, I combine the 
theoretical findings of Miller’s seminal article, “Genre as Social Action,” with a media 
studies approach to textual analysis, in order to account for nonverbal and non-vocal 
aspects of the rant performance constructed via vlog. I rename the performance of 
humorous ranting via vlog as “comedic” in light of the performative and semi-
professional approach to remediating the rant. So, humorous (live) ranting (HR.), when 
recorded in confessional-style and uploaded to YouTube, becomes comedic ranting via 
vlog (CRvV), and the object becomes a comedic rant vlog (CRV). 
It comes down to this: iterations of rants have been cited in Western culture for 
centuries upon centuries (Lindblom & Dunn, 2006; Richlin, 1992; Vrooman, 2002) – but 
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how does comedic ranting in a particular situation (online via vlog) create a unique, and 
potentially powerful, subject position for the YouTube user?  My theory is that those 
video bloggers who have established online personas and gained substantial popularity 
via comedic ranting easily situate themselves in positions of authority; by using invective 
to disapprove of various people, situations or topics, they elevate themselves above 
whichever object they choose to criticize while simultaneously uniting their followers, if 
not with each other (as that determination is beyond the scope of this study), at least with 
the vlogger. Meyer (2000) explains that: 
Humor unites communicators through mutual identification and clarification of 
positions and values, while dividing them through enforcement of norms and 
differentiation of acceptable versus unacceptable behaviors or people. This 
paradox in the functions of humor in communication as, alternately, a unifier and 
divider, allows humor use to delineate social boundaries (p. 310) 
Meyer (2000) also explains that humor emerges in three basic ways in human thought: 
through perceptions of 1) Relief 2) Incongruity and 3) Superiority. Since ranting 
positions the orator outside of the subject at which the rant is directed (what I refer to as 
subject x) in order to critique it, if a rant is comedic, we can understand this rhetorical act 
to meet the third criteria: superiority. This type of humor occurs when 
people laugh outwardly or inwardly at others because they feel some sort of 
triumph over them or feel superior to them in some way […] Laughing at 
“ignorant” actions on the part of others, as adults often laugh at the sayings or 
doings of children, illustrates this perspective (p. 314) 
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Since Burke (1959) elucidates that derisive laughter is cathartic insofar as it promotes 
social unity, I theorize that constructing a cathartic experience for the audience is the 
quintessential social action accomplished by humorous ranting. However, I also highlight 
the intention behind the act (whether or not it is meant to be humorous), as integral to the 
understanding of genre classification. 
By performing catharsis, do YouTube vloggers develop a “superior” subject 
position, at least in relation to the people, objects or situations they ridicule via comedic 
vlog rants, or does this superiority not extend past online identity performance? Does 
their attempt to achieve superiority in their performance of identity grant them more 
social power? 
I will pursue three research questions to this end: 
RQ1: What criteria must a rhetorical act meet in order to be considered a rant? 
How does the researcher distinguish “the rant” as a rhetorical genre?  
RQ2: How might the ability to record and edit oneself within ‘confessional-style’ 
recordings (form) restructure the rant (in form and substance)? How might the 
affordances of YouTube contribute to restructuring the rant (form and substance) 
via vlog (form) as a social action? 
RQ3: Considering the conclusions on media form and rhetorical substance from 
RQ2, how might the researcher go about applying the method? Might other social 
actions arise upon further investigation?  
 





JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY 
 
The significance of this study is multifaceted and interdisciplinary. As Matsuo 
(2010) points out,  
Nowadays, rhetoric is just one among many approaches for analyzing and 
understanding communication: the traditional Speech Communication rhetorical 
and discourse analysis models are still influential, but they exist alongside an 
expanded range of research methods, including both quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies from the social sciences, for example. Often knowledge domains 
intersect: in humanist orientations to communication, critical and cultural studies 
may have significant points of overlap with discourse studies and media studies 
and the knowledge bases of performance studies and public address scholarship p. 
146. 
This examination is an example of how certain “knowledge domains intersect” in 
qualitative research pursuits.  
Since my methodology champions a critical approach to audiovisual social media 
by way of textual analysis, the method is designed to examine both language and 
performance as they construct online identities. A host of research has endeavored to 
examine identity construction online via social networking sites such as Facebook and 
MySpace (Abiala & Hernwall, 2013; Aldridge & Harden, 2014; Carr, Schrock, & 
Dauterman, 2012; Flanigan, Hocevar, & Samahito, 2013; Leung, 2013; Morrison, 2014; 
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Subrahmen &Smahel, 2011; Turkle, 2011:2012; van Zoonen, 2013; Walther, Der Heidge, 
Kim, Westerman, & Tong, 2008; Zhao, Grasmuck, & Martin, 2008), yet less attention 
has been directed toward identity creation on the YouTube platform (see Balance, 2012; 
Ledbetter, 2014; Simonsen, 2012; and Williams, Tyree & Lewis, 2015 for examinations 
of identity on YouTube). This analysis will expand on the discussion of identity 
formation via YouTube, as a social networking site, through the lense of rhetorical genre 
theory. Since speech and emotional display are identity-forming aspects of human 
behavior, and my analysis accounts for the aural as well as the visual, this paradigm 
might also be relevant to social scientific research that examines human behavior situated 
in audio-visual formats. Werner (2012) states that: “Though vlogging has been largely 
overlooked in rhetorical scholarship, it is highly relevant to broader scholarly 
conversations on interactivity and speed in new media, as well as conversations about 
emotion and remediation” (p. 11), and explains that vlogging is a remediation of “earlier 
genres of speech and emotional display” where “remediation endows those genres with 
new meanings and movements, and opens up new possibilities for social action” (iii).  
Additionally, Lange (2015) asserts that rhetorical study of the rant has been 
largely ignored in scholarly pursuits.  While identifying, examining, and critiquing 
particular rhetorical acts that may be organized into typologies, or even precise genres 
(for instance, “eulogy,“ or for my purpose here, “the rant”) has been a concern in the field 
of rhetoric since its inception (Burke, 1971; Corbett & Connors, 1999; Engels, 2009; 
Foss, 1989; Miller, 1984), I add to the fields of rhetoric and media studies by examining 
how an ancient, Western oral tradition (the face to face rant) functions when remediated 
through an audio-visual recording, not only as an act within an act (as a person who vlogs 
	   15	  
is both ranting (an act) and consciously recording their rant (another act)), but as an act 
within the rhetorical situations of A) a specific type of video format (confessional-style) 
on B) a specific platform (YouTube). In doing so, this study serves to support research in 
the fields of rhetoric and media studies that refutes the deterministic theory of rants. 
Media determinists suggest that ranting (or invective, which Vrooman [2002] 
loosely defines as “verbal aggressiveness” [p. 52]) is a phenomenon that arose out of 
computer-mediated communication, but scholars that study iterations of the rant online 
are actively contesting the view that rants are a product of media determinism - a rebuttal 
I hope to fortify with this piece (Vrooman, 2002; Lange, 2015; Werner, 2012).  Indeed, 
Vrooman (2002) specifically indicates invective’s function as a method of subject 
positioning and identity construction throughout the history of rhetorical study. He posits 
invective as a genre, and admits that genre theory differs depending on the discipline 
from which the theory is developed: 
Both Campbell and Jamieson (1978: 19) in the communication studies rhetorical 
tradition, and Freedman and Medaway (1994: 2) in the rhetoric and composition 
tradition, describe genres as strategic, rhetorical responses to similar kinds of 
situations. Carolyn Miller goes further and argues that genres are used to mediate 
between the public and the private, our individual needs and social action (1984: 
163) (pp. 53-54). 
One of the places that invective functions as a genre mediating between the “public and 
the private,” and our “individual needs and social action” is via the online rant: “The 
internet, as a rhetorical situation, requires identity creation and performance and the 
creation and negotiation of a new social order. A common genre through which this is 
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done is invective” (Vrooman, 2002, p. 54). So “invective” is a powerful approach that 
allows the rhetor to create an identity (or position his/herself as a subject), as well as 
negotiate a new social order.  
Interestingly, Vrooman (2002) does not provide a thorough description of the rant 
as genre; rather, he assumes that his audience has a working understanding of what a rant 
is, and uses it as a way to describe one of two different types of invective present in the 
object of his examination (The online newsgroup Alt.flame). According to Vrooman 
(2002), a rant is the manifestation of one type of invective; he differentiates ranting from 
other types of invective by stating that ranting is invective that takes the form of 
“messages of considerable length,” and separates rants into two different types: A) a long 
parody or satire, and “the adjective rant”(p. 59). Campbell and Jamieson (1978) point out 
that one of the recurring shortcomings attributed to previous genre theorists is that 
theorists assume that “a recognized genre already exists” (p. 15). To remedy this 
problem, my first endeavor is to describe in detail the quintessential nature of ranting as a 
recurrent, socially recognizable form. Using Burke (1959; 1961; 1969), I argue that 
humorous ranting in itself constructs a cathartic experience for the audience, but that the 
act of ranting as a recurrent, socially recognizable form does not make ranting a genre.  
Carolyn Miller (1984) explains that rhetorical genres are a product of familiar 
social situations wherein a similar response is elicited; in other words, she claims that 
genres emerge due to the shared recognition, and subsequent common response, of 
rhetors to a given situation. This theory of genre as situational helps me to distinguish 
between the rant as a recurrent oral form in general, the rant as a recurrent humorous oral 
form, and the rhetorical genre of comedic ranting online via video blog. Utilizing Miller’s 
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theory to inform rant genre delineation means addressing the assertion that the context in 
which a rhetorical act occurs is integral to understanding the significance of the act itself. 
The context (or rhetorical situation) of the act is more significant for genre development 
than the form and substance of a given act, according to Miller (1984), because it 
indicates the social motive behind the act. However, her approach still necessitates a 
description of the form and substance of the rant that is specific to the situation in which 
it manifests.  
As such, the study begins with a theory of the rant. Lange (2015) points out that a 
dearth of scholarly research exists pertaining to rants as a genre: a rhetorical act common 
enough to be recognizable by the general population, but elusive enough to necessitate 
further examination in the world of academia.  In conceptualizing the rant as 
quintessentially cathartic, I reinforce the importance of rhetorical criticism, and 
emphasize the importance of rant analysis to the fields of cultural studies, philosophy, 
and psychology. By choosing to analyze rants in comedic form, I provide insight into the 
field of humor and communication and rhetorical philosophy; the former by employing 
current research on verbal aggressive humor, superiority theory and incongruity theory –  
 the latter by describing the comic catharsis constructed by rant performance – a section 
that Williams (2001) points out is “still missing” from Burke’s Motivorum Trilogy (p. 
22). 
Studying the rant in the context of a particular rhetorical situation such as 
YouTube adds value to my study for more than one reason. Insofar as any good theory of 
rhetorical genre has to be responsible to the media environment in which it takes place 
(Brockriede, 1971), it is pertinent to study the rant within the context of the YouTube 
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vlog. Williams, Tyree, and Lewis (2015) explain that, “Perhaps the most popular form of 
blogging used on YouTube is video blogs (also known as vlogs)” (p. 102). Since the 
rhetorical act of ranting has become increasingly popular online (Vrooman, 2002; Lange, 
2015), and particularly via video blogs uploaded on the YouTube platform, this 
examination adds a necessary layer to scholarly pursuits in cultural studies and new 
media studies, as it addresses the ongoing considerations regarding user generated 
content, identity construction and performance on social media, and the exploration of 
how participatory cultures function online (Ledbetter, 2014; Simonsen, 2012; Werner, 
2012). Johnson (2014) explains that, “Social media is not a closed system dominated by 
gatekeepers or large corporations… Web 2.0 highlights the participatory culture of social 
media. Users have control over what they post, what goes viral, what gets shared and 
when” (p. 166). In a similar fashion, Simonsen (2012) claims that, 
YouTube as a media platform is a catalyst of this visibility, by providing ordinary 
people with access as well as control of their own self-images. The most explicit 
type is the audiovisual one-to-one presentation of the self that is sometimes 
referred to as a Video Blog or, as I will refer to it, a Vlog (p. 2) 
While I am not so quick to concede to the idea that users are in complete “control” of 
their online displays of identity, and while it is definitely not the case that vloggers have 
control over what goes viral, I do agree with Simonsen (2012) that the video blog is the 
most explicit display of online identity performance. Regardless, studying comedic 
ranting via vlog means studying identity performance: which has implications for identity 
formation both on and off line.  
As a result, the discussion section of this exposition concludes by imploring that 
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future research takes a closer look at the object in order to examine how performance of 
aspects of identity via CRV might also grant the ranter social influence. The performance 
of comedic ranting via vlog can be examined from the standpoint of feminist criticism, as 
an identity performance that the ranter engages in that claims “I am x gender (or gender 
non-conforming)” in its proclamation that “I am not x;” it may even function as a point of 
resistance (Foucault, 1978) that relies on a proliferation of discourses to challenge 
existing power dynamics. 
In developing a methodology that combines rhetorical genre study with media 
studies and textual analysis, I offer a comprehensive approach to analyzing instantiations 
of the rant intertextually – one that is more appropriate to the present media ecology – 
and one that reinforces how the situation from which a generic act emerges determines 
the significance of the social action that act accomplishes. That being said, future 
researchers might substitute other remediated genres in place of the rant, in order to 
explore how the social action that those genres accomplish (a filmed eulogy, for instance) 
takes on new meaning depending on the environmental factors that gave way to the act’s 
iteration.  Furthermore, since emotional expression is foregrounded in rant performance, 
prospective inquiries in performance studies could utilize the rant criteria developed to 
study iterations of ranting, or perhaps even iterations of expressed emotions of or related 

















The task at hand is to situate ranting via vlog as a genre, so I must first describe 
the typology of the rant in itself, since the act of ranting in itself precedes the act of 
comedic ranting online via vlog (Cohen, 2005; Lange, 2015; Lindblom & Dunn, 2006; 
Vrooman, 2002). In order to do this, I will start with definitions of the rant; these 
definitions will lead to a discussion of Kenneth Burke’s theory of dramatism and his 
concept of catharsis as they relate to Aristotle’s Poetics. Integrating Burke allows for 
identification of the quintessential unifying principle of ranting in itself – the mode of 
action (Burke’s terminology) that ranting accomplishes. From here, I will use Miller’s 
(1984) theory, informed by Meyer (2000) and Vrooman (2002), to show how ranting via 
vlog is significantly different from ranting in other situations and to suggest that comedic 
vlog ranting can accomplish decidedly different social actions (Miller’s terminology) – 
particularly, that it may grant the ranter a form of power. In other words, the ranter’s 
ability to provide a cathartic experience for the audience is contingent upon the 
intricacies of comedic vlog ranting’s construction, and performing the rant in this way 
sanctions a unique and potentially influential subject position for the vlogger. 
Merriam-Webster Online simply defines the ‘rant’ in the following way: “to talk 
loudly and in a way that shows anger: to complain in a way that is unreasonable” 
(Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary, n.d.). Lange (2015) defines rants as “emotional 
messages, often exhibiting anger or frustration, that identify a problem or criticize things” 
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and goes on to claim that “Ranting is an emotional genre, one which is arguably 
persuasive and empathy-arousing because it combines rather than separates passion and 
logic” (p. 2). While both of these definitions claim that ranting expresses anger or a 
similar emotion, the main difference between the first two definitions of the rant is that 
the former claims that ranting is irrational, where the latter asserts that ranting is actually 
logical. Vrooman (2002) argues that “rants share a number of characteristics, not the least 
of which is a goal akin to ‘turning hostility and disillusionment into high art’ (Epsy, 
1983:13) and making “malice exalted… almost to the point of genius (McPhee, 1978: 
10)” (p. 55), and gives us an idea of the form and substance in his assertions that 
“…‘rants’ refers to messages of considerable length” (p. 59), and are “monologues of 
insult” (p. 55). Waisenan (2011), in his discussion of the comedian Dennis Miller and his 
propensity to rant, points out that: “Rants have been described as “speak[ing] or 
shout[ing] at length in an angry, impassioned way” (p. 26).  Both of these definitions 
claim that a rant must be lengthy, and Vrooman’s definition goes a step further in 
claiming that rants are forms of intelligible art. Lindblom and Dunn (2006) of the 
grammar and composition tradition describe rants as “heated complaints” (p. 71), 
whereas Cohen (2005), in the literature studies tradition, describes them as “the voice of 
our longings, our agitations” (p. 252). Commonalities amongst the various definitions 
point to ranting as an expression of heightened emotions of or related to anger (i.e. 
frustration, aggravation, irritation), and while this emotional demonstration is not 
necessarily irrational, it is surely “lengthy” to the point of excess. So what qualifies as 
excessive length, and why the disparity regarding rationality? 
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 Exactly how long a rhetorical act of invective has to be in order to be considered 
a rant cannot be immediately determined based on these definitions. What criteria do one 
use to determine whether or not a particular oral performance is ‘too long’? This is a 
noteworthy problem in developing a typology of the rant, both in itself and in its various 
manifestations. However, if the action that a genre accomplishes is its primary 
developing factor, i.e., that the form and substance of the act are secondary to the action 
achieved as a result of the act, and furthermore, that the form and substance of a 
performance surely changes depending on the rhetorical situation, then explicitly defining 
the length of a vituperative speech act is an unimportant starting point in situating ranting 
as genre (Miller, 1984). Nevertheless, what can be said is that devoting excessive time to 
a subject distinguishes ranting from invective, insofar as invective can describe a single 
word or sentence said in anger (or frustration, etc.) against some person or thing, whereas 
there is undoubtedly more substance to a rant than manifestation in a single word or 
sentence allows. Moreover, the length of the rhetorical act itself is not the only time 
dependent factor involved in the production of the rant.  
Werner (2012) argues that the elapsed time between experiencing an emotional 
impetus to rant and engaging in an act of ranting is very short: 
Like all genres, the rant is associated with a specific composing speed or, to use a 
term from my taxonomy, a tempo. The rant’s composing tempo specifies a 
particular interval between the composing act and the emotion that inspired it – 
or, more precisely, the generative absence of such an interval (p 172).  
So the interval between incitation to emotions of or related to anger and verbal 
articulation of such emotions is minimal. However, he further contends that this emotion 
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must go “unexpressed” for some period of time, “so that it intensifies,” and that rants are 
characterized by a “feverish pacing” (pp. 172-173). This means that an interval of time 
between experiencing an emotional impulse to rant and actually ranting does in fact exist, 
despite its marginality, and that the verbal articulation of the rant must be characterized 
by a quick, uninterrupted rate of speech.  
In lieu of the aforementioned definitions of the rant, it would appear that timing 
(the length of the rant, the pace of the rant, and the perceived amount of time between 
experiencing an emotional impetus to rant and verbally expressing those emotions) could 
account for the “irrationality” cited in its various descriptions. Reformulating the 
definition to include Werner’s observations, ranting in itself is: an impulsive and 
incessant oral expression of emotions of or related to anger - an emotive oral tradition 
wherein the orator devotes a relentless amount of time to denigrating the subject due to 
their heightened feelings regarding the matter, but spends perhaps less time than is 
necessary accurately articulating their rage in a calm, methodical manner. I will argue 
that ranting in itself certainly fits this description, but that comedic ranting via vlog does 
not necessarily, for a variety of reasons. Before I go any further, however, I should clarify 
what I mean by “ranting in itself.” 
Ranting in itself, or “live” ranting 
Ranting in itself may be understood as “live” ranting, other-wise known as face-
to-face ranting, or ranting as mediated only through the body and to other bodies in 
response to an impetus that caused the ranter to experience heighted emotions of or 
related to anger in any particular space. The main difference between comedic ranting via 
vlog (CRvV) and ranting in itself (R.)/ humorous ranting in itself (HR.), lies in the 
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situation from which the rant emerges. “Live” ranting as an impulsive oral expression of 
emotions is a reaction to a stimulus that occurs within a ‘relatively short period of time’: 
a stimulus which I refer to as subject x. While it is true that many situations may incite an 
orator to rant, rants arise out of a frustration with, or anger toward, the actions of a person 
or persons within a particular situation. Take driving for example: many people rant 
about driving (traffic, being cut off, absence of turn signals, stopping abruptly, etc.), yet 
driving cannot occur without the presence of a driver, and while the driver doesn’t have 
to be anyone specific, they must be someone; as such, rants are directed toward a 
particular person or class of people. So subject x incites the ranter to anger (or similarly 
frustrates, irritates, aggravates the ranter), causing the ranter to impulsively express those 
emotions verbally/ orally, and incessantly, to whomever shares a physical space with the 
ranter within that relatively short period of time. Furthermore, in the pages that follow I 
argue that through the act of ranting, the ranter engages in a fundamentally cathartic 
experience – the “live” ranter purges emotions of or related to anger by articulating their 
feelings aloud, and this mode of action is cathartic.  
On the other hand, a comedic rant vlog (CRV) is a much more formulaic 
articulation of emotions directed toward subject x, bounded within stylistic approaches to 
humor, audio-visual recordings, and the affordances of YouTube. As such, the time 
elapsed between experiencing an emotional impulse to rant and uploading a comedic rant 
vlog on YouTube is prolonged, and the length and rate of the act cannot necessarily be 
characterized as impulsive or incessant (though I argue it must still appear to be both). 
Comedic ranting via vlog is mediated on multiple levels, complicating the notion that 
ranting, as a recurring type, is essentially a brash method of ‘getting something out of 
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your system’. It is my contention, however, that “live” ranting (R.) and humorous  live 
ranting (HR.) as quintessentially cathartic rhetorical acts, must be understood prior to 
proceeding with a detailed description of comedic ranting via vlog (CRvV), particularly 
because comedic ranting via vlog imitates the form of humorous ranting in itself, and so 
it must appear that the comedic vlog ranter is motivated by releasing heightened 
emotions of or related to anger impulsively and incessantly, despite what their actual 
motivations might be for uploading the comedic rant vlog (CRV) to YouTube.  
Catharsis 
Catharsis is defined as: 
1. the act or process of releasing a strong emotion (such as pity or fear) especially 
by expressing it in an art form.  
2 a :  purification or purgation of the emotions (as pity and fear) primarily 
through art. b :  a purification or purgation that brings about spiritual renewal or 
release from tension  
3 : elimination of a complex by bringing it to consciousness and affording it 
expression. (Merriam-Webster online dictionary, n.d.)  
For the purposes of this study, the catharsis achieved by ranting in itself can be 
understood as the process of releasing emotions of or related to anger (aggravation, 
frustration, irritation, etc.), purification or purgation of said emotions that brings about a 
release from tension, and the elimination of said emotions by affording them expression.  
Admittedly, I left out the aspects of the third leg of the definition that describe eradicated 
emotions as manifest in a ‘complex’ that must be brought to ‘consciousness’ - and this 
omission is absolutely deliberate. The third classification is rooted in psychoanalysis, and 
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since this study champions rhetorical analysis by integrating rhetorical philosophy, 
careful word choice is imperative, so as to avoid interdisciplinary confusion – especially 
since Burke’s theories surrounding catharsis employ a physicalist analogy. Indeed, it is 
clear that the Demonic Trinity (referenced below) is an explicit reference to Freudian 
psychoanalysis, but the excremental metaphor that I liken to ranting is just that – a 
metaphor. It is more important to position this discussion of the bodily purge as it relates 
to ranting within Burke’s theory of dramatism.  
Dramatism relies on describing a rhetorical act by manner of a pentad, where the 
five points of the pentad reference dramatic liturgy; this philosophy must be elucidated in 
order to understand the motivation behind the act. Burke (1971) explains that,  
In a rounded statement about motives, you must have some word that names the 
act (names what took place, in thought or deed), and another that names the scene 
(the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred); also, you must 
indicate what person or kind of person (agent) performed the act, what means or 
instruments he used (agency), and the purpose. Men may violently disagree about 
the purposes behind a given act, or about the character of the person who did it, or 
how he did it, or in what kind of situation he acted; or they may insist upon totally 
different words in order to name the act itself. But be that as it may, any complete 
statement about motives will offer some kind of answers to these five questions: 
what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how 
he did it (agency), and why (purpose). (p. 76) 
He goes on to declare this complete statement about motives as a methodology, 
explaining that, “The titular word for our own method is ‘dramatism,’ since it invites one 
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to consider the matter of motives in a perspective that, being developed from the analysis 
of drama, treats language and thought primarily as modes of action” (p. 82). Marie 
Hochmuth Nichols (1971) elaborates further on Burke’s affinity for these particular 
terms, explaining that despite their reference to dramatic literature, “[Burke] nevertheless 
intends that his observations be considered pertinent to the social sphere in general” (p. 
108). So what does this mean for a treatment of catharsis as the principal motivation 
behind R.? First, it should be noted that Burke’s (1959) article “On Catharsis, or 
Resolution” opens with an explicit tribute: “I assume that such a project should be 
developed with Aristotle’s Poetics in mind” (p. 337). While much of Burke’s 
terminology is born out of his analysis of dramatic literature, Williams (2001) explains 
that “The ‘“Dramatistic” step,’ he suggested in Dramatism and Development (1972) is 
‘from specific literary analysis to the consideration of human motivation in general’” (p. 
5).  
Burke (1959) orients his discussion of catharsis around the body, proclaiming that 
dramatic poetry as cathartic can be described in terms of its likeness to bodily purging. In 
others words, just as the body must purge physically in order to be cleansed, so too must 
it purge emotionally; this emotional purge is the action that the performance of dramatic 
theater serves to accomplish, and this action can be described using bodily metaphors. He 
likens the experience of tragic theater to physical experience, describing pity as “a 
movement toward,” and fear as “a movement away from” (p. 342), where pity and fear 
comprise “an essential conflict” (p. 341) of tragedy in terms of their simultaneous 
existence, forcing the audience to reconcile “contradictory impulses” (p. 341). Put 
differently and continuing with the physical analogy, the audience is pulled in opposing 
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directions in their experience of tragedy, and this divergence occurs as they experience 
pity and fear concurrently. He argues that there is a third impulse that factors into the 
conflicting relationship of pity and fear innate in tragedy, and that this complication is 
pride, otherwise known as Hamartia or “the fatal flaw,”  
Since misfortune moves us most to pity when it is undeserved and since we are 
most moved to fear when the sufferer is in some notable way like ourselves, the 
tragic hamartia is a remarkably efficient way of engaging an audience. By giving 
an otherwise admirable person a mere flaw in character, the playwright avoids the 
extremes of making him either too bad (for our pity) or too good (for our ability to 
identify ourselves with him); but at the same time he endows the character with a 
motive whereby the disaster would to some degree be the logical result of the 
character’s own decisions. (pp. 348-349)  
It is this third attribute that allows the audience to accept what happens within the tragedy 
and experience catharsis; in other words, the audience accepts the tragedy that befalls the 
central character, because the protagonist is inherently flawed; the audience can feel 
relieved because they were able to identify pride as the source of the protagonist’s 
eventual demise, and they find comfort in the knowledge that possessing too much pride 
is a mistake, one that they themselves would not make. The idea that a person’s behavior 
is a direct result of their internal personality, rather than a response to external 
environmental factors, is known in the field of psychology as Fundamental Attribution 
Error (Amabile, Ross, & Steinmetz, 1977); also known as correspondence bias, this 
theory is often adopted in interpersonal communication to explain human interactive 
behavior. 
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Since the aforementioned descriptions of the rant in itself characterize it as an 
impulsive and incessant oral expression of emotions of or related to anger, and since the 
pages that follow employ Burke’s use of bodily metaphors to describe the experience of 
catharsis achieved by R., it is pertinent here to clarify how the purge that results from an 
experience of dramatic theater (i.e., catharsis experienced on behalf of the audience) can 
likewise be attributed to manifestations of the rant within bodies throughout history (i.e., 
catharsis experienced on behalf of the ranter through the act of ranting in itself). Burke 
(1959) remarks that: 
Perhaps purgation of this sort is best grounded in Croce’s calculus, which equates 
catharsis with ‘expression.’ And unquestionably the symbol-using animal 
experiences a certain kind of ‘relief’ in the mere act of converting any inarticulate 
muddle into the orderly terms of a symbol system. (p. 364) 
If the ranter is the symbol-using animal (since all human beings are, at least according to 
Burke), then ranting is one way to achieve catharsis, as it articulates (hastily, poorly, 
irrationally even, but nonetheless) negative feelings, and therefore culminates in relief by 
default. Yet this seems too easy, since any verbal expression of an “inarticulate muddle,” 
would necessarily be cathartic by this measure. A return to Burke’s A Rhetoric of Motives 
(1969), describes the situation of the rant a bit better, by way of his notion of pure 
persuasion: 
Pure persuasion involves the saying of something, not for an extra-verbal 
advantage to be got by the saying, but because of a satisfaction intrinsic to the 
saying. It summons because it likes the feel of a summons. It would be non-
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plussed if the summons were answered. It attacks because it revels in the sheer 
syllables of vituperation (p. 269) 
If Burke’s dramatism can describe R., one would have to provide a description of 
the act (rant), the agent (ranter), the scene (subject x does something that angers, 
frustrates, irritates, etc. the ranter which incites ranter to rant), the agency (impulsive and 
incessant expression of emotions of or related to anger via verbal/oral articulation), and 
the purpose (to purge emotions of or related to anger). This is obviously achievable. 
However, in subsequent explanations of CRvV, I will explain how the dramatist pentad 
doesn’t accurately account for iterations of the rant on the YouTube platform, since the 
motivation behind ranting is much more elusive in iterations of CRVs (Werner, 2012) 
due to their performative nature. In other words, although CRVs appear to be motivated 
by catharsis, they are not necessarily. Before I get there, I will further describe the 
motivation behind R., not only as cathartic, but as a purge that can be metaphorically 
analogous to bodily refuse.  
In terms of bodily purging and in homage to the Demonic Trinity, Burke (1959) 
specifically, likens “pity, fear, and pride” to the experiences of bodily functions specific 
to orgasm, diureses, and excrement, respectively (p. 356). It is this third analogy, the idea 
that pride can be likened somehow to excrement, that informs my development of ranting 
in itself as a typology. According to Burke (1959), “pride in its simplicity would be 
excremental” as pride involves problems of power, and “incites to anger and vengeance 
(also excremental)” (p. 356); he elaborates on this further by explicating that, “Aristotle 
also remarks that anger drives out fear” (p. 360). If “live” ranting is an expression of 
“bottled up” anger at a particular person, object, or situation, then it stands to reason that 
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the ranter does not fear the object of his anger – does not move away – or, if she feels 
fear, feeling of fear is overwhelmed by feelings of anger. In fact, the ranter’s experience 
of the object of his/her rage is quite the opposite; rather than retreating, the ranter is 
confident in her assurance, and moves toward the object of anger, rather than away from 
it.  If pride incites to anger and vengeance, and rants are characterized by anger, then it 
stands to reason that one who rants must be categorized as proud.  
With these ideas in mind it is possible that the rant as an impulsive, incessant oral 
tradition (characterized by anger) could be described as an excessive sort of verbal 
excrement: one that is aggressive, lengthy, and difficult to contain or interrupt. One might 
even express ranting as “verbal diarrhea,” insofar as rants can seem wild, uncontrollable, 
violent and explosive – a build up of emotion that effectively spews out of the orator’s 
mouth (I trust the metaphor is clear enough that we may avoid a description of its 
counterpart). So essentially, the ranter assumes the position of proud pooper, (Prince/ 
Princess of the purge?) and we’re left with a question: how can facing up to frantic 
unfettered feces provide a cathartic experience for the audience?  
To be fair, the metaphor that pride/ anger is excremental aligns with the definition 
of the “live” ranting (R.), but does not account for Lange’s assertion that ranting 
combines passion and logic, and fails to reconcile Vrooman’s claim that ranting is a 
“high art” marked by some stroke of “genius.” This disparity in describing the rant can be 
attributed to the rhetorical situation (see chapter IV for explanation) from which the rant 
emerges; where a common definition might describe the rant in itself, both Vrooman 
(2002) and Lange (2015) develop explanations of the rant that are specific to its 
instantiations online. This contextual difference is significant in developing rant genre, 
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because where the rant is situated changes the composition of the rant. And if expression 
of anger via the rant is akin to purging bodily excrement (since the ranter exhibits both 
pride and anger and expression of pride/anger = feces), how might the catharsis inherent 
in the act of ranting become a construction that shifts the purgation of emotions from the 
ranter to the audience in comedic rant performance, and how is this catharsis constructed 
in comedic rant vlogs (CRVs)? To continue with the bodily metaphor, what situations 
have to be present in order for ‘explosive excrement’ to culminate in comic catharsis? 
Humor and Comedy 
The answer here lies in the continuity between tragedy and comedy. In a follow-
up article entitled, “Catharsis – Second View,” Burke (1961) goes on to say that, “So far 
as the body participates directly in the production of catharsis by the organizing of 
symbol systems, its two principle expressions are laughter and tears” (p. 107). So crying 
and laughing are identified as the two most cathartic human actions, and we can 
understand these actions as being positioned on opposite ends of the expressed emotional 
spectrum. He is also sure to point out that human beings are the only species that laugh (a 
point which has been challenged and arguably disproven over the 50+ years since the 
article’s publication), and that often times, hysterical laughter results in tears – an 
observation which intimates an innate connection between cathartic experience of the 
tragic and the comic alike.  
Golden (1984) was particularly interested in Aristotle’s discussion of catharsis as 
it related to comedy, and claimed that, “Since comedy has been placed in polar 
opposition to tragedy in terms of the object it imitates […] we should expect that it must 
be placed in polar opposition to tragedy also in terms of the emotion that it evokes” (p. 
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287). He extrapolates on this further by offering an explanation for the emotion that 
would stand in for the polar opposite of pity, citing Aristotle’s Rhetoric to postulate 
indignation as pity’s emotional opposite: 
Events which evoke our ‘indignation’ (nemesan) in a comic context must meet 
two specific criteria: (1) they must manifest some dimension of unjustified good 
fortune or of inappropriate and incongruous behavior; and (2) such incidents 
(which can be described as examples of error or ugliness) must be presented in 
such a way that they do not generate any painful feelings on the part of the 
audience but are clearly recognized as forms of the ridiculous (p 288). 
So, pity is to tragedy as indignation is to comedy, and indignation is most definitely an 
emotion of or related to anger; indeed, sometimes the terms anger and indignation are 
used interchangeably. Burke (1959) also quips that the Demonic Trinity can be treated as 
a parody of the Holy Trinity (Power, Love, and Wisdom), where Pride (feces) is the 
parody of Power. He explains pride as “the dropping of dung on an inferior, or an 
inferior’s fighting back with dung” (p. 356), and let’s face it: there’s nothing more 
ridiculous (arguably ridiculously hilarious) than witnessing someone or something being 
defecated on, as long as, as Golden (1984) explained: 1) the subject deserves it and 2) the 
witness does not experience injurious emotions as a result. 
I have now positioned the ranter as a ridiculous (yet respected) waste wielder - a 
person motivated by the expression of anger or indignation or some such other similar 
emotion – who, regardless of their position as either inferior or superior to the subject that 
he/she derides, isn’t afraid to fling feces at the subject of his/her scorn. And, if R. can be 
understood as an oral shit-storm targeted at subject x, then the humorous rant in itself 
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(HR.) can likewise be described as an act whereby the process of relentlessly shitting on 
x, assuming shitting on x is justifiable in some way and ridiculous enough to not cause 
the audience pain, is humorous; the ranter’s incessant derision of x is acceptable due to a 
mutual recognition that x warrants ridicule, and when this mutual recognition culminates 
in laughter, we have comic catharsis achieved at the expense of the shat upon. Burke 
states that (1959): 
But, just as pity may lead to moral indignation, (which I would think but a 
“fragment” of tragic catharsis), so laughter may be not only friendly but derisive. 
And I would not consider derision as wholly cathartic, except insofar as we need 
our partisan alignments, too, and are socially united by the particular butt of 
humor at whose expense we jointly laugh. (p. 362) 
The idea that derisive laughter is cathartic due to its unifying nature is not isolated to 
Burke. In a similar fashion, Meyer (2000) claims that “Laughing at faulty behavior can 
also reinforce unity among group members, as a feeling of superiority over those being 
ridiculed can coexist with a feeling of belonging (Duncan, 1982);” but he also explains an 
applicable theory of humor origin known as superiority theory: “From a superiority 
theory perspective, humor results, not just from something irrational or unexpected, but 
from seeing oneself as superior, right, or triumphant in contrast to one who is inferior, 
wrong, or defeated” (pp. 314-315). Based on this description, it would seem that the act 
of justifiably denigrating x in a ridiculous manner positions the ranter as superior to 
whichever subject x they choose to deride. In other words, in hurling dung at x, the ranter 
transforms the function of Pride. Allow me to demonstrate how. 
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 I have yet to explicitly state how Pride functions in comic performance, 
juxtaposed to its characterization as the fatal flaw in tragic performance. Since I have 
reasoned that a ranter must exhibit pride, it is necessary to treat pride as a significant 
emotion in the development of rant genre, alongside emotions of or related to anger. And, 
since Pride is a terminal defect in tragic performance, it must be something else entirely 
in comedic performance – perhaps an immortal strength? The symmetry does not quite 
add up. If Pride allows the audience to accept whatever befalls the protagonist in tragedy, 
since the audience can attribute the protagonist’s shortcomings to a terminal character 
flaw (Hamartia), one that they themselves do not possess, and (HR.) elevates the ranter 
above whichsoever subject they choose to deride, then the humorous ranter’s pride must 
be a redeeming factor. In other words, if the audience identifies with the ranter’s 
denigration of x (since the derision of x is justifiable, and since the method of derision is 
ridiculous), since the ranter exhibits pride in that vituperation, then the audience must 
identify that pride as an emotion they share with the ranter, in order to feel superior to 
subject x. But the ranter can exhibit pride in a non-humorous rant performance as well, 
since not all rants are humorous. So how does pride function in R., regardless of whether 
or not the performance is comedic, tragic, or something else entirely? 
 Pride is a complicated human emotion, and one that carries both negative and 
positive connotations. The first thing that comes to mind when I think of pride, for 
instance, is its Christian affiliation. Okay, fine – truthfully, the first thing that comes to 
mind is Morgan Freeman’s voice in the film Se7en. I can hear that calming intonation as 
he, assuming the role of detective Somerset, recounts the seven deadly sins in the squad 
room: “Gluttony. Greed. Sloth, Wrath, Pride, Lust, and Envy.” Of course, deeming pride 
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as sinful advances the idea that pride is a negative attribute, a connotation that falls in line 
with Aristotle’s Hamartia in tragic performance. But it is a more constructive 
configuration of pride, one that situates pride as a necessary precursor to the derisive, 
incessant verbal articulations of the rant, that is pertinent. The type of pride that ‘incites 
to anger and vengeance,’ in rant performance is the type of pride that claims, “I 
vehemently disapprove.” If the ranter expresses heightened anger, frustration, 
indignation, etc. toward subject x, i.e. if the ranter scorns x, then the ranter renounces x, 
and the act of rejecting x necessarily defines the ranter as separate from x. Put differently, 
the ranter’s differentiation from x is a method of subject positioning; insofar as the ranter 
denies x, they describe their own condition as not-x in effect, so the proclamation “I 
vehemently disapprove of x” becomes a declaration of “I am not x.” For example, “I 
vehemently disapprove of erratic drivers” becomes “I am not an erratic driver.” In this 
way, ranters exhibit pride in their ability to drive “better than” other more unpredictable 
drivers, and differentiates themselves from these types of drivers. 
In his review of rants, Vrooman (2002) argues that “This style of invective seems 
to have corresponded to a specific kind of identity-forming situation: the need to maintain 
continual distance from society and the need to defend that isolated position by 
denigrating the society” (p. 56). This claim gives me pause, as it assumes that the ranter’s 
anger is directed toward society as a whole, positing x = society in every possible 
instance. It is interesting (and perhaps intuitive) to assume that the ranter experiences 
emotions of or related to anger as a result of being a member of society. While I am sure 
it is the case that certain practitioners of ‘monologues of insult’ may have intended to 
isolate themselves from society, this distinction does not apply to all rhetors wherein 
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ranting is manifest, since not all ranters direct their attention toward subjects that demean 
society at large. Besides, denigrating factions of people within a society does not 
preclude the ranter’s membership in the larger social order; surely, if subject x is socially 
incongruous to begin with, then the ranter is actually reasserting his/her citizenship by 
shitting in a socially acceptable place. So while I agree with Vrooman (2002) that ranting 
dissociates the ranter from the subject of said rant, I do not agree that the substance of 
every rant disparages society as a whole. 
What is more interesting about Vrooman’s (2002) assertion that ranting 
guarantees the ranter’s “separateness from the society which they critique,” is that he 
immediately follows this claim by citing an “extreme kind of sexual humor,” historically 
characteristic of ranting, one whose “focus on things sexual, especially things that might 
be considered taboo breaking or obscene […] might also be explained as a way of 
signifying a certain type of political self-expression” afforded to people in some type of 
“powerless” situation (pp. 55-57).  He points out that sexual humor sees significant 
crossover with scatological humor throughout history, and since I have a vested interest 
in gender and sexuality studies (my propensity for toilet humor now firmly established) 
but have yet to offer additional criteria for the substance of the rant (a category that must 
be accounted for in order to operationalize Miller’s theory of genre as social action), I 
will narrow my focus in this exposition to consider CRVs containing subject matter that 
is explicitly sexual. 
Live ranting (R.) 
The substance of the rant determined, it is now time to revisit the formulation of 
the rant pre-catharsis, in order to incorporate both catharsis and humor into the re-
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articulation. Here we go now: ranting in itself (R.) is an impulsive, incessant oral 
expression of heightened emotions of or related to anger - an emotive oral tradition 
wherein the orator devotes a relentless amount of time to denigrating subject x due to 
his/her heightened feelings regarding x, but spends perhaps less time than is necessary 
accurately articulating their rage in a calm, methodical manner, due to the ranter’s 
fervent need to purge the emotions evoked by x AND distance themselves from x in so 
doing. In this way, ranting toward subject x declares: “I vehemently disapprove of x,” 
(which effectively declares: “I am not x”). This is the definition of ranting in itself. 
Metaphorically speaking then, ranting in itself might be described as an inflammatory 
bodily reaction to a physical irritation - an explosive corporeal regimen that excessively 
defiles due to uncontrollable expulsion of explosive excrement experienced abruptly; 
violently overwhelmed by biological necessity the body is cleansed, purified of the 
perfunctory prickliness which previously plagued them 
Humorous live ranting (HR.) 
The definition of humorous ranting in itself HR. would include the 
aforementioned descriptions: 
Ranting in itself is an impulsive, incessant oral expression of heightened emotions of or 
related to anger - an emotive oral tradition wherein the orator devotes a relentless amount 
of time to deriding subject x due to his/her heightened feelings regarding x, but spends 
perhaps less time than is necessary accurately articulating their rage in a calm, methodical 
manner, due to the ranter’s fervent need to purge the emotions evoked by x AND distance 
themselves from x in so doing. In this way, ranting toward subject x declares: “I 
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vehemently disapprove of x,” (which effectively declares: “I am not x”), and would add 
to this description the notion that: 
 
If the ranter is both justifiable and ridiculous in declaring: “I vehemently disapprove of 
x,” (which effectively declares: “I am not x”), then the ranter uses humor to construct a 
cathartic experience for the audience. Insofar as the audience identifies with the ranter, 
the catharsis constructed culminates in laughter, and catharsis has been achieved.  
Metaphorically speaking, ranting in itself might be described as an inflammatory bodily 
reaction to a physical irritation - an explosive corporeal regimen that excessively defiles 
due to uncontrollable expulsion of explosive excrement experienced abruptly; violently 
overwhelmed by biological necessity the body is cleansed, purified of the perfunctory 
prickliness which previously plagued them. 
And also: 
If the body happens to defile something (subject x) that deserves directed defecation, but 
is not normally a refuse receptacle, and the manner in which it does so is out of the 
ordinary (one can assume it probably would be) then this purging process is humorous. 
Insofar as the audience identifies with the ranter (if the audience both understands the 
experience of dire diarrhea and believes subject x deserves to be defiled), the catharsis 
constructed culminates in laughter, and catharsis has been achieved.  
I have purposefully decided to leave out discussions of intentionality in my 
descriptions of HR. This is because I believe there is a difference between humorous 
ranting in itself (HR.) as a mode of pure persuasion that culminates in catharsis, and 
comedic ranting via vlog (CRvV.) on YouTube. Recall that another limitation of studying 
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the rant through a rhetorical lens is the inability to prove whether or not an act of ranting 
actually made people laugh, since audience reception is beyond the scope of the analysis. 
Meyer (2000) suggests that, “[The] receiver-centered nature of humor, focusing on the 
intended effect of a message on hearers, suggests that a rhetorical perspective on humor 
will lead to insights into how humor influences audiences” (p. 311). Since this project 
hopes to add value to humor communication research, the intentionality behind the 
justifiable yet incessant denigration of x achieved by CRV performance must also be 
considered. In performing the rant with the intention of making others laugh, the ranter 
performs catharsis, regardless of whether or not that catharsis is achieved by every person 
who experiences the rant. On the other hand, if a ranter rants as a form of pure persuasion 
in order to achieve catharsis for themselves, and witnesses happen to find it funny despite 
the fact that the ranter did not intend for it to be funny, then this act also performs 
catharsis, albeit with a different motivation, and its form and substance are still deserving 
of rhetorical scrutiny. But since my description of the comedic vlog rant genre relies on 
intentional humor in the form of superiority theory, my description of comedic rant vlogs 
(CRVs) must include their construction as inherently comedic, not accidentally or 
fortuitously comedic.  
I have demonstrated how ranting (verbal diarrhea, if you like) is motivated by 
catharsis (insofar as the act of ranting can be likened to purging bodily excrement) in lieu 
of Burke’s notion of pure persuasion I theorized that the derision characteristic of 
humorous ranting can be described in terms of defecating on subject x (metaphorically); I 
located pride as an emotion just as significant to comedy (Burke, Aristotle, and Golden’s 
verbiage) as it is to tragedy in the performance of catharsis, and elucidated that the comic 
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catharsis achieved by ranting unifies an audience; by situating them as members of a 
community superior to and separate from subject x, the ranter positions his/herself as not-
x, and achievement of comic catharsis is contingent upon the audience’s ability to 
identify with the ranter.  
I imagine it isn’t immediately clear why I have devoted so much time to 
describing R. both plainly and metaphorically, since the overall task is to develop a 
methodology equipped to examine CRVs. Rhetorical genre theory demands an in-depth 
understanding of the rhetorical situation from which a given act emerges, and since 
ranting is a recurrent oral performance evidenced since Grecian antiquity that has been 
“largely ignored in scholarly pursuits” (Lange, 2015), It is necessary to describe strictly 
oral/verbal iterations of the rant before I describe comedic ranting via vlog (CRvV). 
Moreover, since rant performance is a product of our exposure to rants pre-vlog, and 
since rants pre-vlog have emerged in a variety of different contexts, one has to 
understand, to whatever extent one can, the situations present that lead to this recurring 
rhetorical act, and the typology that has emerged as a result. And since it is impossible to 
understand the intricacies of so many different environments, cultures, and languages, it 
seems that the only approach to gaining an understanding of the rant pre-vlog is to situate 
the rant within the human body. After all, the rant always occurs in the rhetorical 
situation of the body first and foremost. The body is the first point of mediation. My hope 
is that establishing the rant in the rhetorical situation of the body and positing it as an 
impulsive and incessant expression of emotion that can be described using bodily 
metaphors might offer some over-arching insight into why rants have endured, despite 
their emergence from a multitude of diverse and dynamic social contexts.  If ranting is 
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identifiable by the expression of apparent and underlying human emotions (apparent = 
anger/ underlying = pride) manifest in the familiar landscape of the body, then it stands to 
reason that the shared understanding of the rant as a recurring type (despite obvious 
differences in the description of the thing) must somehow be related to the species, to 
humanity’s “generic nature” as “animal[s]” (Burke, 1959, p. 342).  
So, I differentiate (R.) from (HR.) by positing the derision of subject x as 
justifiable and ridiculous in the latter. The task is now parsing HR from (CRvV) (which 
involves more than a simple discussion of intentionality).  In the chapters that follow, I 
offer a description of comedic rant vlogs (CRVs) based on, but notably different from, 
the description of R. that I outline above. These differences are largely due to the 
performative nature of CRVs, as well as the unique situation from which the CRV 
emerges. Informed by Miller (1984), I argue that CRvV is not actually impulsive or 
incessant, so much as it appears to be, and that while the ranting vlogger still devotes an 
incessant amount of time to denigrating x, the process of recording and uploading a video 
to YouTube requires that they spend more time articulating their rage, which not only 
changes the form and the substance of the rant, but shifts the motive behind ranting, 
displacing the ranter’s “fervent need” to purge emotions with other, much more 
complicated reasons to create CRV’s. However, the comedic vlog ranter must still 
maintain the facade of expressing heightened emotions that justifiably and ridiculously 
assert: “I vehemently disapprove of x,” and situating their rant within confessional-style 
recordings on the YouTube platform allows them to construct a cathartic experience for 
the audience that is more deliberate and rational than HR., opening up a range of 
possibilities for the social actions that comedic ranting via vlog may accomplish. 











In order to continue to differentiate the R. and HR. from the CRV, I will begin 
with a broad examination of how Aristotle categorized rhetoric; this discussion will 
transition from Aristotle’s rhetorical classifications into a more specific examination of 
rhetorical genre theory’s contemporary history, and end with an in depth description of 
Carolyn Miller’s seminal article Genre as Social Action (1984). Using Miller’s archetype, 
I articulate a theory of the comedic vlog rant based on the preceding chapter’s return to 
Aristotle via Burke; finally, I will outline a rant paradigm specific to video blogging, in 
order to adequately describe the rhetorical situation of comedic vlog rants that emerge via 
YouTube. 
Ultimately, the configuration considered herein is the video blog – a product that 
came about thousands of years after Aristotle first attempted to explain the practicality of 
rhetoric, so far removed from the range of possibilities during his era that it might even 
seem odd, at least at first, to apply this classical theory to such a modern object. 
However, as Werner (2012) points out, vlogging is a remediation of “earlier genres of 
speech and emotional display [and] remediation endows those genres with new meanings 
and movements, and opens up new possibilities for social action” (p. iii). Nonetheless, 
considering Aristotle’s taxonomy provides a useful starting point for an examination of 
rhetorical genre theory, for more than one reason. First off, identifying, examining, and 
	   44	  
critiquing particular rhetorical acts that may be organized into typologies, or even precise 
genres (for instance, “eulogy,“ or for my purpose here, “the rant”) has been a concern in 
the field of rhetoric since its inception (Burke, 1971; Corbett & Connors, 1999; Engels, 
2009; Foss, 1989; Miller, 1984; Yates & Orlikowski, 1992). Since the rant itself is an 
impulsive and incessant oral expression of heightened emotions of or related to anger, 
examining how emotions are articulated is paramount.  At the beginning of Book 2 On 
Rheotric, Aristotle provides a detailed description of anger that includes an experience of 
catharsis upon release of that anger: 
1. Let anger be [defined as] desire, accompanied by [mental and physical] 
distress, for apparent retaliation because of an apparent slight that was directed, 
without justification, against oneself or those near to one. 2. If this is what anger 
is, necessarily the angry person always becomes angry at some particular 
individual (for example, at Cleon but not at an [unidentified] human being) and 
because he has done or is going to do something to him or to those near him; and 
a kind of pleasure follows all experience of anger […] 3. Belittling [oligoria] is an 
actualization of opinion about what seems worthless… and there are three species 
of belittling: contempt [kataphronesis], spite [epereasmos], and insult [hybris] 
(Kennedy, 2007, p. 116) 
It is the third species of belittling – insult – that is most closely aligned with rant 
typology, as it is an act that expresses emotions of or related to anger directed at a 
particular other (subject x) due to something that subject x has done.  Or, to use 
previously established bodily metaphors, it is inflammation of the bowel resulting in 
excrement that one chooses to sling toward subject x because maybe x gave them a 
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laxative, or offered them spoiled food, or scared the shit out of them, etc. Richlin (1992) 
claims that the earliest documented instances of ranting (instead of “rant” she uses the 
term “invective,” a distinction I reconcile elsewhere) in Roman writings surfaced by way 
of Roman humor. However, Lindblom and Dunn (2006) trace ranting “back as far as 
ancient Greece,” (p. 71), and Vrooman (2002) provides evidence for this claim when he 
explains that, “Rosen notes a ‘predilection for scatological and sexual obscenity’ in 
Grecian invective (1988:73),” reminding researchers that Roman humor emulates their 
pre-existing Greek counterpart (as cited in Vrooman, 2002, p. 55). The bottom line is 
this: Aristotle developed classifications of rhetoric while immersed in a time period in 
which comedic ranting was already occurring in a recognizable form, and while 
considering Burke’s treatment of his Poetics informs a description of the motivation 
behind the rant, the categorizations Aristotle outlines in On Rhetoric fail to position the 
rant as a member of one of his three over-arching genera.  
It has been argued that Aristotle was one of the first to attempt to formulate a 
theory of rhetorical genre, due to his characterization of particular instances of rhetoric by 
species (Jamieson, 1973; Yates & Orlikowski, 1992). Kennedy (2007) explains that the 
distinction between species is: 
based on whether or not the audience is or is not a judge, in the sense of being 
able to take specific action as a result of being persuaded to do so, and the time 
with which each species is concerned: 
a. If a judge of past actions, the species is judicial 
b. If a judge of future action, the species is deliberative 
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c. If an observer of the speech, not called on to take action, the species is 
epideictic 
Built on this distinction, the struggle would be to determine where the comedic rant falls 
on this spectrum. Is it judicial, deliberative, or epideictic? Surely, it depends on certain 
features of the monologue. However, there are limitations in application with the 
aforementioned categorizations; namely, in terms of identifying patterns or motifs, 
Aristotle’s speciation falls short. Allow me to demonstrate how.  
The question is: how might one characterize the rant according to Aristotle’s 
speciation? It appears that the first task at hand would be to determine where this 
impulsive, incessant oral aggressiveness occurred, and to what audience. The key here is 
that there must be an audience, and that this audience must be either a judge of past or 
future actions, or they must simply be an observer, unmoved by the words of the orator. 
Now suppose that an act of ranting in itself has occurred and been witnessed, and that the 
subject of said rant is bad tippers in restaurants. If a person is moved to rant to their 
coworkers about a tip they have already received, then their coworkers become judges of 
the past actions of the ranter’s customer(s), and the rant is judicial. However, if a person 
rants to their coworkers about how all foreigners are bad tippers, and their coworkers 
have a non-English speaking table that is dining at the same time that the ranter 
vituperates, perhaps they are judging the future actions of the people at their table based 
on the ranter’s assertions. Here, the ranter has made the audience (their coworkers), a 
judge of future actions (the future actions of their guests upon paying their bill), and 
therefore the rant would be deliberative. So, we can see how a rant to the same people 
about the same subject can be typified as two different species by Aristotle’s 
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categorizations, depending on the rhetorical situation. Jamieson (1973) describes the 
Aristotelian taxonomy as one that “fractures” when “confronted by the data with which 
the contemporary critic must deal,” and specifically mentions the “verbal tantrum,” as 
one example of such ill-fitted contemporary data (p. 162). The verbal tantrum is 
essentially another way to describe the rant. Yet despite the shortcomings of his 
aforementioned classifications, his characterization of the quintessential nature of rhetoric 
itself seems to fall in line with Carolyn Miller’s theory, which she expounds in “Genre as 
Social Action.”  
According to Kennedy (2007) “Modern scholars have tended to attribute to 
Aristotle the view that rhetoric is a productive art” (p. 16); the problem with this 
accreditation is that it is misguided. Kennedy explains how Aristotle defined rhetoric as 
“an ability of ‘seeing’ the available means of persuasion,” but also characterized rhetoric 
both as a tool at the rhetor’s disposal, and as one of three legs of intellectual activity: 
namely, a practical art, (which is different from a productive art) (p. 16). What is 
interesting about this brainpower tripartite is that each leg is characterized by its ability to 
achieve a particular objective. According to Kennedy (2007), a productive art (ie: 
poetics) is concerned with “making,” whereas a second leg, “intellectual sciences,” aims 
to acquire “knowledge for knowledge’s sake,” and is concerned with knowing (think hard 
sciences); finally the third involves “doing” something and is named “practical arts,” 
where some examples are “politics and ethics” (p.16). Aristotle’s distinctions among the 
three legs of intellectual activity appear to be mutually exclusive; if this is in fact the 
case, then modern scholars would (incorrectly) claim that rhetoric allows the rhetor to 
make something, as a productive art, but not to do something, as a practical art. This 
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seems odd considering the examples that Aristotle himself provides of practical arts – 
surely both politics and ethics are accomplished using rhetoric. This is the delicate nature 
of rhetoric itself, at least as Kennedy (2007) elucidates: to Aristotle, rhetoric is both an 
instrument and an art, an art that allows us (as rhetors) to do something, to practice, but 
not, as modern scholars suggest, to make something. This is evidenced in Book 2 of On 
Rhetoric, when, a bit later in the section on anger, Aristotle claims that “The cause of 
pleasure to those who give insult is that they think they themselves become more superior 
by ill-treating others” (Kennedy, 2007, p. 117).  So rhetoric motivated by anger, and in 
the form of insult, causes the rhetor to feel pleasure in their belief that they have elevated 
themselves above subject x – a practical accomplishment. Metaphorically speaking, 
shitting on someone makes us feel and believe that we are superior. But does this 
necessarily prohibit the rhetor from making something, i.e.: can a practical art not also be 
a productive art? Can the impulsive and incessant expression of emotions of or related to 
anger, characterized by derisive language, be poetic? Is there an artful way to fling feces? 
I argue the answer is yes, and one of the ways that a practical art functions as a 
productive art is by way of the comedic vlog rant.   
Kenneth Burke 
According to Burke (1959), Aristotle’s Poetics provides insight into what 
dramatic liturgy and performance can do for an audience, but since “problems of 
“catharsis” are situated precisely at that point where analysis of language in terms of 
Poetics both sums up the field of Poetics proper and through sheer superabundance 
inclines to “spill over” into other areas of linguistic action” (p. 340), it stands to reason 
that discussions of catharsis cannot be limited to any one leg of intellectual activity. And 
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since Burke’s theory of Dramatism relies on the notion that ‘language and thought’ are 
‘modes of action,’ we can distinguish Burke from Aristotle by clarifying that Burke’s 
view of rhetoric is much more all-encompassing than Aristotle’s, insofar as it includes 
not only poetics, but all verbal and oral symbols, and could even account for some 
nonverbal symbols (Johannesen, 1971). That being said, both Johannesen (1971) and 
Nichols (1971) underscore Burke’s proclivity for Aristotelian principles; in fact, Nichols 
(1971) explains that Burke’s Dramatism was the result of “ a clue from Aristotle’s 
consideration of the ‘circumstances’ of an action” (p. 109).  
This then begs the question: If Dramatism is to be understood ontologically (i.e.: 
dramatic liturgy and performance is the ranter’s world, or whatever situation from which 
the rant emerges (the scene), and the theater’s audience is the ranter (agent), and 
impulsively and incessantly expressing emotions of or related to anger with derisive 
language orally or verbally (act) is cathartic and elevating (purpose), then how do the 
instruments at the ranter’s disposal (agency) change the act? The purpose? The scene? 
Can Dramatism account for generic groupings in ways that Aristotle does not, or was 
Burke, so “strongly allied with the classicists” (Nichols, 1971, p. 109) that his 
contemporary theory ‘fractures’ (in Jamieson’s words) in its attempts to “account for the 
wide range of rhetorical acts” (Brockriede, 1971) in contemporary Western Civilization? 
Aristotle’s aforementioned categories of intelligence delineate poetics as a productive art, 
rhetoric as a practical art, and imply that these types of intelligences are mutually 
excusive, and the rant can be attributed to both. His speciation of particular kinds of 
rhetoric not only does not account for the rant, but relies on audience response to the act, 
whereas Burke’s rhetorical paradigm, aimed at naming the motive behind an act, focuses 
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on the rhetorical act itself, rather than the audience. And while I use Burke to describe the 
motivation behind the recurrent act of ranting in itself and humorous ranting in itself 
(sans intentionality), I must turn to rhetorical genre theory more explicitly focused on the 
social order, in order to continue with a description of the rant. Since agency is a point of 
contention in the field of media students, particularly as it regards user-generated content, 
differentiating between Burke’s agency and the situation of comedic ranting via vlog as a 
genre does not permit me to apply Dramatism, as Burke’s paradigm is confounded, 
particularly at the points of scene, agency and purpose, when applied to comedic ranting 
via vlog.  
The choice to describe the act of live ranting with the metaphor of excrement is an 
homage to Burke; he claims that motive is partially animalistic in nature, since it is 
affected by emotion, so observing isolated acts of human emotional expression doesn’t 
provide a complete understanding of the nature of verbal/oral expression or of human 
interaction. Burke (1959; 1961) claims that catharsis purifies the self as a symbol-using 
animal, offering the researcher an opportunity to situate catharsis as the principal 
motivation behind ranting in itself. So, symbolic actions (ideas, thoughts, language) are 
analogues for bodily actions. Burke (2001) tries to create a more comprehensive and 
complete view of man as the symbol-using animal, because in his view Behaviorism is “a 
misshapen fragment of Dramatism in disguise” (p. 41). He selects dramatism because it is 
an act, it’s what we do; my argument is that ranting in itself/ humorous ranting in itself is 
something we do to purge emotions of or related to anger for the sake of purifying, but 
that comedic ranting via vlog is something different entirely, in motivation as well as 
action. And situating ranting within an audio-visual recording on a particular platform in 
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a particular style means considering a complex rhetorical situation – one that reflects an 
act embedded within another act – as the act of ranting occurs within the act of recording 
and uploading a video. The dramatist’s relationship status on Facebook might read: “It’s 
complicated” with “YouTube videos.”  
Genre Theory 
According to Miller (1984) genres are “typified rhetorical actions based in 
recurrent situations” (p. 159), and since an action is simply a thing done, it appears that 
Aristotle would likely agree with Miller that in categorizing rhetoric, it makes sense to 
delineate genres based on the actions they’re used to accomplish. In developing a 
working theory of rhetorical genre, Miller (1984) claims that, “if genre represents action, 
it must involve situation and motive, because human action, whether symbolic or 
otherwise, is interpretable only against a context of situation and through the attributing 
of motives” (p. 152). While I am not so quick to claim that all human action must be 
interpreted based on these criteria, I do agree with Miller’s assertion that genre is a social 
action. As such, it is necessary to position the context of the situation as paramount in 
understanding the genre of a given act, since it is the combination of situation and motive 
that must be examined in order to determine what social action a recurring form 
accomplishes. Such an exhaustive description of the motivation behind the rant must now 
give way to a discussion of position, in order to locate the comedic vlog rant within a 
particular rhetorical situation.  
 Campbell and Jamieson (1978) recount that it wasn’t until 1965 with Edwin 
Black’s publication of Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method, that the neo-Aristotelian 
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model was challenged in the wake of a new framework for understanding rhetoric: a 
generic approach: 
Black’s work was noteworthy on several accounts. It argued for an organic 
critical method, one which emphasized form but was not formulary; it located 
clusters of discourses based on recurrent strategies, situations and effects; and it 
revealed the weaknesses of the neo-Aristotelian perspective as a basis for writing 
a developmental history of rhetoric. p. 10.  
In short, although Black’s theory neglected to offer a concrete taxonomy of genre, he did 
identify “modes of discourse characterized by certain strategies that seemed more likely 
to occur in certain kinds of situations,” and his work was a breath of fresh air in the field 
of rhetorical theory at the time, one that served as the impetus for “the explosion of 
unconventional critical essays” that appeared in its wake (Campbell and Jamieson, 1978, 
p. 10). So Burke emphasized the significance of the interplay between the ‘scene’ where 
an ‘agent’ ‘acts’ with ‘agency’ in its ability to expose the motivations (‘purpose’) behind 
the act, and Black stressed the importance of understanding ‘certain kinds of situations’ 
from which the act emerges in order to locate it in history. Rather than equating Burke’s 
‘scene’ with Black’s ‘situation,’ it is important to differentiate between the two in 
developing a genre of the CRvV; separating the notion of scene from situation is 
important in genre development, and particularly in the confines of this exposition, due to 
complicated function of time in examining CRvVs. Time will be discussed in detail in 
discerning ranting in itself/humorous ranting in itself as a typology from the genre of the 
comedic rant via vlog. 
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Lloyd Bitzer’s thorough explanation of the (rhetorical) situation was a significant 
contribution to the field of rhetorical theory, and paved the way to the predominantly 
accepted view of genre that it is implemented herein. Bitzer (1971) contends that the 
situation from which an act emerges is quintessential in understanding an act of rhetoric, 
because  
a work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of something 
beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or change in the world; it 
performs some task. In short, rhetoric is a mode of altering reality, not by the 
direct application of energy to objects, but by the creation of discourse which 
changes reality through the mediation of thought and action (p. 384) 
He then provides a detailed definition of what exactly is meant by the phrase ‘rhetorical 
situation:’ 
Let us regard rhetorical situation as a natural context of persons, events, objects, 
relations, and an exigence which strongly invited utterance; this invited utterance 
participates naturally in the situation, is in many instances necessary to the 
completion of situational activity, and by means of its participation with situation 
obtains meaning and its rhetorical character […] The situation dictates the sorts of 
observations to be made; it dictates the significant physical and verbal responses; 
and, we must admit, it constrains the words which are uttered… (p. 385). 
This description of rhetorical situation allows us to view rhetorical acts as responses to an 
exigence, or exigencies, which is a central component of the ‘genre as social action’ 
paradigm, and markedly different from Burke’s focus on motive.  
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The most notable essay on rhetorical genre theory occurs some 20 years after 
Bitzer’s explanation of rhetorical situation, with Carolyn Miller’s seminal piece “Genre 
as a Social Action.” Miller (1984) explains exigence as a, “crucial difference” in the 
relationship between Bitzer’s rhetorical situation and Burke’s ‘scene,’ and notes that: 
“Burke’s focus is on human action, whereas Bitzer’s appears to be on reaction” (p. 155), 
but she reformulates Bitzer’s notion of exigence considerably in her assertion that, 
“Exigence is a form of social knowledge, a mutual construing of objects, events, 
interests, and purposes that not only links them but makes them what they are: an 
objectified social need” (p. 157), and reasons that this social need is based on the human 
propensity to classify types of situations: 
What recurs is not a material situation (a real, objective, factual event) but our 
construal of a type. The typified situation, including typifications of participants, 
underlies typification in rhetoric. Successful communication would require that 
the participants share common types; this is possible insofar as types are socially 
created (or biologically innate) (p. 157) 
 So the assertion here is that rhetorical acts that are recurrent can be classified by 
genre, only if they occur in a ‘typified’ situation with ‘typified’ participants, and that 
these rhetorical types are socially recognizable because either these types of situations 
that lead to rhetorical types recur in society, or because these rhetorical types are in some 
way inherently related to the physical nature of the human body. She then rejects Burke 
and Bitzer in the same breath when she claims further that “Exigence must be seen 
neither as a cause of rhetorical action nor as intention, but as social motive” (p. 158). If 
genre is identifiable based on the social action it achieves, and this includes types of 
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participants in types of situations that lead to types of rhetorical acts, then it follows that 
in classifying ranting as a genre, determining what the rant accomplishes in the social 
realm is initially more important than describing in detail what the rant actually is: what 
form it takes and the substance of the thing. But this leaves us at an impasse; due to my 
previous assertion that ranting in itself/ humorous ranting in itself (unintentionally 
humorous, to be clear) is fundamentally motivated by catharsis (and purging is 
biologically innate), how do we get from the physical realm to the social realm? How 
does (humorous) ranting relate to comedic ranting via vlog?  
In order to understand the association between “live ranting” (see p. 23 for 
definition) and vlog ranting, I will revisit the description of ranting in itself: (R.) is an 
impulsive, incessant oral expression of heightened emotions of or related to anger - an 
emotive oral tradition wherein the orator devotes a relentless amount of time to 
denigrating subject x due to his/her heightened feelings regarding x, but spends perhaps 
less time than is necessary accurately articulating their rage in a calm, methodical 
manner, due to the ranter’s fervent need to purge the emotions evoked by x AND distance 
themselves from x in so doing. In this way, ranting toward subject x declares: “I 
vehemently disapprove of x,” (which effectively declares: “I am not x”). Also recall that 
humorous ranting in itself (HR.) would include the above definition, but add to it the 
notion that: If the ranter is both justifiable and ridiculous in declaring: “I vehemently 
disapprove of x,” (which effectively declares: “I am not x”), then the ranter’s use of 
humor constructs a cathartic experience for the audience. Insofar as the audience 
identifies with the ranter, the catharsis constructed culminates in laughter, and catharsis 
has been achieved. These explanations purport that R. is motivated by catharsis, and also 
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stake a claim as to what (unintended) HR. can “do” for an audience (construct a cathartic 
experience). So what does comedic ranting via vlog do? How is CRvV different from 
HR.? And what is the difference between humor and comedy? Deconstructing Miller’s 
paradigm and positioning rant performance within the audiovisual recording will offer 
insight into these questions. While it is true that Miller’s theory is based on the 
delineation that what an act does is more important than the form and substance of the 
act, a discussion of form and substance is still necessary in developing rant genre in 
accordance with her paradigm. To this end, 1) the form and substance of the rant as it 
occurs within the recording, and the 2) form and substance of the recording as it exists on 
the YouTube platform, must be described and situated within the rhetorical situation of 
YouTube. Before I transition into the methodology section, I’ll give you a hint as to what 
I mean by this. 
 Since comedic ranting via vlog is a performance of the humorous rant, and is 
mediated not only through the body, but through an audiovisual recording, CRVs actually 
present us with an act within an act – performance of the rant within the audio-visual 
recording. This means there are multiple rhetorical situations at work in CRV’s, since 
audio-visual recordings (film, television, news broadcasts and even video blogs) are 
discursive in nature, and when situated within a particular rhetorical situation (YouTube) 
embrace a recurring form (confessional-style format), which, when combined with a 
particular substance (in this case – rant performance), confounds the ideas of motivation 
(in Burke’s capitulation) and exigence (in Bitzer’s capitulation). That being said, CRV’s 
actually give us much more insight into Miller’s idea of exigence, which she describes as 
social motive. In HR., the humor may be unintended, so there is no certainty in 
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pinpointing the social motive present. On the other hand, since the act of making a video 
of oneself and uploading it to the YouTube platform is absolutely intentional, if the 
verbal/oral expression included within the rant vlog takes the form of humorous ranting 
in itself, we can understand the humor constructed as intentional, regardless of whether or 
not the people on the receiving end (the viewers), find it funny (Meyer, 2000).  
Since intentionally humorous ranting occurs on YouTube via video blog - a form 
that disrupts the “assumed divisions between amateur and professional, market and non-
market practices and motivations,” on YouTube - and since certain YouTube users 
(vloggers) have utilized this form on YouTube in “an entrepreneurial way,” I have chosen 
to distinguish between (humorous) ranting (HR.) and comedic ranting via vlog (CRvV), 
using the term “comedic” to distinguish the professional nature (Burgess & Green, 2009, 
pp. 93-96) of comedic vlog ranting performance as separate from the more natural 
considerations of humorous ranting outlined previously. In other words, labeling the acts 
of ranting via vlog considered herein as comedic as opposed to humorous functions as a 
way to connote not only their performative nature, but to highlight their (somewhat) 
professional production on the YouTube platform. Table 1, entitled “Rants as Symbolic 
Action” highlights the differences among the aforementioned rant descriptions, while 
simultaneously displaying how Dramatism struggles to account for the act of comedic 
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Table 1. Rants as Symbolic Action 
As this table shows, determining the scene, agency, and purpose of CRVs is much 
more complex than determining the scene, agency and purpose of live ranting. The first 
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five columns can be understood to relate specifically to Burke’s pentad (see parentheses 
for analogies), while the sixth column is an explicit reference to Miller’s genre paradigm. 
What is the scene (the where and when) that demands YouTube vlogging, and 
specifically comedic rant vlogging, and how can the purpose be understood? Pentadic 
analysis cannot accurately account for CRVs, as the act of ranting is embedded within the 
act of making a video of oneself, which involves a time delay. Burke’s rhetorical 
philosophy is based on the assumption that a particular act occurs in time and space – i.e.: 
that there must be a where and when - and this approach requires immediacy. Because the 
‘where’ and ‘when’ of the rant vlog is ruptured – because the action that occurs in a 
particular location is a performance that is taped and altered and uploaded - the time-
space continuum is disturbed, and the object of analysis is altogether different. As such, 
another rhetorical paradigm must be employed. The above characterization of CRVs’ 
‘scene’ and ‘purpose’ are suggestions reached by combining media studies research with 
Miller’s (1984) hierarchical paradigm of genre as social action. Since Miller contends 
that classifying a recurring rhetorical act as a genre relies on identifying the social motive 
that calls the persistent act into being, the description of her hierarchy that follows must 
necessarily focus on the YouTube video blog as the object of analysis. This rhetorical 
approach more accurately accounts for the tiered elements of comedic ranting via vlog 


















In order to ascertain the exigence or ‘objectified social need’ that calls comedic 
vlog rants on YouTube into being, I combine an understanding of Miller’s hierarchical 
theory of rhetorical genre with contemporary research in the field of communication and 
media studies (DiCioccio, 2012; Infante, Trebing, Shepherd, & Seeds, 1984; Lange, 
2015; Merriam, 2002; Molyneaux, O’Donnell, Gibson, & Singer, 2008; Ng & Kidder, 
2010; O’Hallaran, 2011; Shary, 2004; Simonsen (2012); Tyree, Williams, & Lewis, 
2015; Werner, 2012), suggesting that rhetorical criticism can situate CRVs as a genre; it 
is my contention that textual analysis can pinpoint, or at the very least strongly suggest, 
the social motives involved in creating comedic vlog rants. Frey, Botan, and Kreps 
(2000) define rhetorical criticism as a “systematic method for describing, analyzing, 
interpreting, and evaluating the persuasive force of messages embedded within texts” and 
point out that in genre criticism, “standards vary according to the particular type, or 
genre, of text being studied” (pp. 229-233). Since my chief concern is to analyze video 
blogs as texts that contain rant performance, I employ a qualitative approach to the object 
of my analysis, adopting both interpretive and critical perspectives. Merriam (2002) 
summarizes the qualitative approach in general: 
qualitative research attempts to understand and make sense of phenomena from 
the participant’s perspective. The researcher can approach the phenomenon from 
an interpretive, critical, or postmodern stance. All qualitative research is 
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characterized by the search for meaning and understanding, the researcher as the 
primary instrument of data collection and analysis, an inductive investigation 
strategy, and a richly descriptive end product (p. 6) 
And while the interpretive approach is geared toward grasping the semantic value of 
human interaction and experience, the critical approach “investigates how the social and 
political aspects of the situation shape the reality” (p. 4), which is particularly important 
in locating genre. This methodology is both interpretive and critical.  
Built on comparative theory, I have utilized rhetorical criticism to demonstrate 
“how theories apply to the practice of persuasive discourse” (Frey, Botan, & Kreps, 2000, 
p. 230). I accomplished this by applying Dramatistic criticism to different iterations of 
ranting, which showed that pentadic analysis does not account for acts within acts (such 
as comedic ranting via vlog), but that it can shed light on live ranting as a recurring type. 
I offered an account of the rant as a recognizable and recurring type by examining 
Burke’s concept of catharsis and combining this knowledge with an application of 
Burke’s theory of Dramatism, settling on catharsis as the chief motivation (purpose) 
behind live ranting. I have also reasoned that humorous ranting “does” two things: it 
declares “I am not x,” and it constructs a cathartic experience for the audience. Since the 
actor within the video blog (the vlogger) engages in rant performance, they imitate live 
ranting; in other words, the form and substance of the verbal act within the vlog mimics 
live ranting. However, the purpose or motivation behind creating CRVs differs 
considerably from live ranting. 
 Transitioning from Burke to Miller makes possible a ‘richly descriptive’ 
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articulation of the comedic rant vlog, and highlights the shortcomings of settling on one 
particular theory over another. Miller’s (1984) theory (outlined below) facilitates a 
description of how the affordances of YouTube enable users to utilize the platform’s 
available tools to record and upload videos of themselves engaged in the performance of 
comedic ranting – a performance which mirrors ‘live’ humorous ranting, but is decidedly 
different. I contend that the difference between humorous ranting and comedic ranting 
via vlog is that in the case of the latter (CRvV), the vlogger is utilizing humor 
intentionally, and thus I label their performance as comedic (as opposed to humorous), 
due to both the intention behind the act and the ‘professional’ subject positioning that the 
vlogger assumes by way of recording their rant performance. However, this same theory 
would not have been able to convincingly suggest the purpose behind live ranting (the act 
that comedic rant vlogs imitate), while Burke’s Dramatistic pentad can and does. Since 
understanding the motivation behind live ranting is a necessary precursor to describing 
the form and substance of the performed rant, they go together like [insert cultural cliché 
here].  
This inquiry aims to describe the exigence of ranting via YouTube vlog, making 
the object of rhetorical analysis (the rhetorical act) the video blog uploaded on YouTube. 
Simonsen (2012) has described video blogs as “an audiovisual one-to-one presentation of 
the self,” and characterizes them as the most information-rich artifact for studying 
constructions of the self on the internet (p. 2), yet other academic research on YouTube 
has chosen to focus on how video blogs invite interaction (Burgess and Green, 2009; 
Werner, 2012), and build community (Balance, 2012; Burgess and Green, 2009; 
Ledbetter, 2014; Tyree, Williams, & Lewis, 2015; Werner, 2012) through the 
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‘confessional-style’ format they adopt. All theorists seem to agree, however, that this 
‘audiovisual one to one presentation of the self’ creates a feeling of immediacy or 
intimacy for the viewer, and this idea of ‘closeness’ or ‘nearness’ challenges the strictly 
physical denotation of proximity typically associated with intimacy. That proximity, 
immediacy and intimacy are notions complicated by the digital era is not a novel idea, 
though it is significant. Since I approach YouTube vlogs though a rhetorical lens, the 
confessional format has meaning. Miller (1984) asserts that, “Form is perceived as the 
ways in which substance is symbolized” (p. 159), so the form of the video blog as a 
rhetorical act serves also as an organizing principle - not only to categorize the milieu of 
videos on the YouTube platform, but to ascribe meaning to them. 
 Burgess and Green (2009), note this “recognizable mode of production and [a] 
particular aesthetic style associated with the culture of user-created content on YouTube” 
(p. 90) as an artistic association that can often befuddle the ‘professional-amateur divide’ 
characteristic of the platform. According to them, the vlog’s form is “often associated 
with ‘amateur’ video production” (p. 93), though they are sure to point out that not all 
vlogs are amateur. They explain that  
Videoblogging, or ‘vlogging,’ is a dominant form of user-created content, and it 
is fundamental to YouTube’s sense of community. Typically structured primarily 
around a monologue delivered directly to the camera, vlogs are characteristically 
produced with little more than a webcam and some witty editing. The subject 
matter ranges from reasoned political debate to the mundane details of every day 
life and impassioned rants about YouTube itself. Vlogging itself is not necessarily 
new or unique to YouTube, but it is an emblematic form of YouTube 
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participation. The form has antecedents in webcam culture, personal blogging, 
and the more widespread ‘confessional culture’ that characterizes television talk 
shows and reality television focused on the observation of everyday life (p. 94).  
Since vlogging occurs in a particular and ‘emblematic’ form (confessional-style) in a 
particular rhetorical situation (YouTube) with a wide range of subject matter, or 
substance (a popular one being the impassioned rant), and has been described as an act 
that facilitates interaction and builds communities, we can understand the Vlog as a genre 
of the YouTube platform, by combining media research with Miller’s theory of genre as 
social action (1984). 
Miller (1984) explicates the relationship between substance, form, context and 
social motive in her assertion that: “The combination of form and substance at one level 
becomes an action (has meaning) at a higher level when that combination itself acquires 
form. Each action is interpretable against the context provided by actions at higher 
levels” (p. 160). She provides this pictorial description of the hierarchy (Figure 1). It 
begins at the very basic level of language and experience, denoting the first form of 
language and experience as grammar (language governed by rules and structures) and the 
first substance as lexicon (the words available in a given language) which when 
combined with grammar become a sentence or “action” that has meaning.  
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Fig. 1. Miller’s (1984) hierarchical theory of genre as social action 
 
Miller (1984) provides a more comprehensive description of this hierarchy below: 
But since context itself is hierarchical, as Toulmin emphasizes, we can think of 
form, substance, and context as relative, not absolute; they occur at many levels 
on a hierarchy of meaning. When form and substance are fused at one level, they 
acquire semantic value which is then subject to formalizing at a higher level. At 
one level, for example, the semantic values of a string of words and their syntactic 
relationships in a sentence acquire meaning (pragmatic value as action) when 
together they serve as substance for the higher-level form of the speech act. In 
turn, this combination of substance and form acquires meaning when it serves as 
substance for the still higher-level form imposed by, say, a language-game. Thus, 
form at one level becomes an aspect of substance at a higher level (this is what 
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makes form "significant"), although it is still analyzable as form at the lower level 
[…] It is through this hierarchical combination of form and substance that 
symbolic structures take on pragmatic force and become interpretable actions; 
when fused, the substantive and formal components can acquire meaning in 
context. A complex hierarchy of such relationships is necessary for constructing 
meaning (pp. 159-160, my emphasis). 
Since I am using this paradigm to develop a genre of the CRV as a rhetorical act, and the 
CRV is a unique combination of form and substance that exists on the upper level of a 
hierarchy of discourses, I think it is pertinent to describe this hierarchy from the bottom 
up – and this is what I have done thus far. This logic is based on the overwhelming 
agreement (cited previously) that ranting as a rhetorical act preceded the act of ranting via 
vlog. As Drake (2013) famously echoes: “started from the bottom now we’re here” (on 
Nothing Was the Same). 
In situating the rant within the human body and describing what R. and HR. “do,” 
I have suggested that rants about a particular subject claim, “I vehemently disapprove of 
x,” which results in differentiation from x (since this statement of disapproval claims, by 
default, “I am not x”). While rants directed toward x merely differentiate the ranter from 
x, humorous rants about x differentiate the ranter from x AND construct a cathartic 
experience for the audience (by framing derision of x as both justifiable and ridiculous). I 
have reasoned that the motive of R. and HR. is catharsis, and have provided some 
conditions for the form and substance of R. and HR., though I have not delineated either 
in detail. Describing the form and substance of ranting is the next step in the process, 
since adhering to Miller’s (1984) hierarchy means being able to describe the form and 
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substance of each level of action, from the lower levels “(words, sentences, speech acts, 
text, etc.)” upward (p. 163). My description of the humorous rant (a speech act positioned 
on a lower level of Miller’s hierarchy as it relates to the comedic rant vlog), was 
developed on the premise of the rant in general as an action, and does not provide explicit 
criteria that may be used to determine both the form of the rant (stylistic elements of the 
recurring type that indicate the nature of the act itself as a purge), or the substance of the 
rant (derisive words, phrases, etc. that refer to sexual subject matter in a ridiculous 
manner, and are justified).  
Since I have chosen to examine comedic ranting via vlog, the form and substance 
of the language utilized within the video will be most closely aligned with my previous 
description of humorous ranting. Since humorous ranting is a justifiable and ridiculous 
reaction to x, and since the oral derision directed toward ignoble x is an impulsive, 
incessant oral expression of heightened emotions of or related to anger, we can 
extrapolate from these adjectives a list of criteria that the form and substance of the rant 
should meet. In considering humorous rants, the words impulsive, incessant, and 
explosive (I take explosive to be synonymous with the ‘oral expression of heightened 
emotions of or related to anger, including frustration, irritation, etc.’ – an homage to the 
pride/anger = feces analogy from chapter II) must be operationalized, in order to 
explicate the relationship that their conceptual definitions have to the form of the speech 
act. Similarly, derisive, justifiable, and, ridiculous must be operationalized in terms of the 
substance of the speech act. Moreover, since I will be analyzing rants focused on sexual 
subject matter, I must also provide some indication of what constitutes sexual subject 
matter. 
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Form of HR 
In order to operationalize the aforementioned conceptual definitions to provide 
guidelines for the form of the rant, I start by restating the obvious: rants are monologues. 
Miller (1984) pinpoints monologue specifically as a stylistic approach that must be 
understood in its relation to common usage within the socio-cultural discourse from 
which it emerges. In other words, the intention behind the rant (a monologue) has to be 
understood, not in terms of the intention behind the individual act, but in terms of the 
“conventionalized social purpose” (Miller, 1984, p. 162) of ranting generically. The rant 
as a particular recurring type is called into being by the shared recognition that certain 
situations elicit rants as a typical social response. 
In monologue, personal intentions must be accommodated to public exigencies—
because the audience is larger, the opportunity for complex statement is greater, 
and constraints are less easily managed; more elaborate rule structures at the 
upper end of the hierarchy, at the level of whole discourses, are therefore 
necessary for both formulation and interpretation” (Miller, 1984, p. 162).   
Since the humorous rant is a monologue, and Miller contends that monologues are 
subject to a different set of rules due to their enhanced ‘opportunity for complex 
statement,’ monologues like ranting must be highly structured – more so even than 
dialogue.  
In order to further describe the structure or stylistic qualities of rants, the next task 
is to operationalize the adjectival description of the thing. The form of the rant is 
impulsive – meaning impetuous or, thinking back to Werner’s (2012) description, marked 
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by a ‘feverish pacing,’ which denotes an abnormally quick rate of composition (one that 
implies little time between provocation and the oral articulation of the emotion 
provoked); incessant – meaning the verbal act must continue uninterrupted for an 
excessive or disproportionate amount of time; and finally, explosive – meaning the oral 
expression is intense, loud, uncontrollable and sudden. I have adopted Werner’s (2012) 
criteria for operationalizing the impulsive nature of ranting in the verbal sense, but what 
determines whether or not something is ‘excessive’ or spoken about for a 
‘disproportionate amount of time,”’ and how can the oral expression of anger as 
‘explosive?’ be understood? Furthermore, since my approach defines the rant as mediated 
through the body, it is not enough to account for the form and substance of the verbal 
articulation alone; nonverbal codes sent by the body during the rant must also be 
considered.  
Truly, it is much easier to operationalize explosive than it is incessant, since the 
definition of the word ‘explosive’ carries with it physical qualifications that can 
stylistically describe speech acts in much the same way that disasters or explosions are 
described. What does it mean for a speech act to be articulated in an explosive manner? 
Well, explosions are intense, loud, sudden and uncontrollable – adjectives that can also 
accurately describe both verbal and nonverbal qualities of the rant. But what qualities of a 
speech act enable its description as incessant?  
Well, incessant definitely means without stopping, which can be described as 
uninterrupted. Operationalizing uninterrupted is relatively easy, as it simply means 
ceaseless, and we can understand uninterruptable as unable to “get a word in edgewise,” 
as my mother has often said, which implies minimal pausing between one sentence and 
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the next. But what are some other conceptualizations of incessant? One synonym is 
continual, which means uninterrupted, but also means repetitive – and since ranting is a 
vehement disapproval of x, some of that fervor and zealousness may manifest in 
repetition. Since a ranter is overly enthusiastic and intense, we can also understand the 
rant as an “in your face” speech act – one that must occur in close proximity to the 
witness of the act. Table 2 below, entitled “Humorous Rant (HR.) Form” provides 
conditions for both verbal and nonverbal operationalization of the form of the rant, based 
on qualified interpretation of the words “impulsive,” “incessant,” and “explosive.” 
According to Frey et al. (2000) “Communication scholars also often function as qualified 
interpreters of texts” due to their training within the Communication field (p. 227). 
However, since Miller’s theory also includes a disclaimer (i.e.: that an identifiable 
taxonomy with strict criteria for form and substance cannot ever be reached, due to the 
















Impulsive Impetuous; implies 
little time between 
provocation and 
oral articulation of 
emotions evoked; 
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* Absence of 
segues from one 
topic to another 




* Rate of speech 
must be quick 
* Fluency of 
language must be 
great 
* Increasing or 
consistently high 
vocal pitch 
* Eye behavior is 
exaggerated. 
 * Jerky 
movements 
Incessant Oral articulation 
continues 
uninterrupted for a 
disproportionate or 
excessive amount 
of time  
* Emotions are 
articulated more 
than once, or 
repeated verbally;  
* Ranter explains 
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throughout 
* Very little 
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sentences.  
* Person close in 
physical space 
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subject x might 
involve the 
metaphor “I shit on 
x” or “x = shit,” or 
some variation of 
excreting on x. 
* Higher pitches 
signify heightened 
emotions (of or 
related to anger) 
* Volume is 
high/increases 
when subject x is 
mentioned or 
denigrated 
* Tone marked by 
emotions of or 




flailing, rapid eye 
and head 
movements, etc.) 
Table 2. Humorous Rant (HR.) Form 
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Substance of HR 
To operationalize the substance of the rant for the purposes of this study, I must 
describe the manner in which the act of ranting can both justifiably and ridiculously 
deride subject x, and must also provide some insight into what the ranter identifies as 
taboo breaking or obscene sexual behavior. Admittedly, the substance of humorous 
ranting in itself (HR.) is conceivably indiscriminate in terms of subject matter, as it is 
possible that any particular subject may be the object of a ranter’s scorn. While I have 
previously confessed that my choice to focus on rants with sexual content is partially a 
result of my own academic interest in gender studies and sexuality, I would like to also 
reiterate that Vrooman (2002) noted that the subject matter of rants traditionally centers 
around, “…things sexual, especially things that might be considered taboo-breaking or 
obscene” (p. 57). Since Miller (1984) defines the substance of a generic text as the 
meaning created by the discourse utilized pertaining to a particular topic, or the “semantic 
value of discourse [that] constitutes the aspects of common experience that are being 
symbolized,” and since sexual acts constitute ‘common experience’ for the vast majority 
of the population, I chose to focus on rant vlogs rife with sexual subject matter.  
But what does it mean to be justifiable, ridiculous, and derisive, and how can 
these conceptual definitions be operationalized? While I was careful to describe the form 
of the rant both verbally and nonverbally, the substance of the rant is much more limiting, 
insofar as the justification and derision present should be understood primarily in terms 
of the meaning derived from the verbal articulation. In other words, the justification 
characteristic of ranting does not rely on nonverbal expression to signify meaning, and 
the derision enacted via ranting relies heavily on verbal articulation, though kinetic 
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features (specifically nonverbal emblems, which are arguably verbal) have been sited in a 
list of verbally aggressive messages (Infante, Trebing, Shepherd, & Seeds, 1984). What 
makes a rant ridiculous, however, is articulated both verbally and nonverbally, and 
should be interpreted as such. As a result, I will start with a description of what it means 
for a rant to be justifiable and derisive, and discuss the ridiculous nature of ranting 
substance last. 
Although there are many different senses wherein a live speech act can be viewed 
as justifiable, in the case of ranting, justifiable merely means that the ranter provides 
reasons for why subject x has become the topic of their scorn, or explains the conditions 
that lead to denigrating subject x. In other words, the ranter provides insight into this fill-
in-the-blank: “I vehemently disapprove of x because ____________.” The reasoning 
doesn’t have to be compelling – indeed, in the case of ranting, it might be viewed as 
irrational according to some – but it does have to be present. Also present in the 
substance of the rant is derision, or denigration. This qualification of the rant was derived 
from previous definitions that cited ‘invective’ or ‘verbal aggressiveness’ as a defining 
characteristic of the act (Vrooman, 2002), and from Aristotle’s own conception of 
belittling as a form of anger expression (Kennedy, 2007). DiCioccio (2012) contends that  
Although researchers have identified different types of aggressive verbal 
messages, they all share the same purpose: to harm or damage the target. Infante 
et al. (1984) labeled 10 communication behaviors as possible messages of verbal 
aggression: (a) character attacks, (b) competence attacks, (c) background attacks, 
(d) physical appearance attacks, (e) ridicule, (f) teasing, (g) threats, (h) swearing, 
(i) nonverbal emblems, and (j) maledictions (p. 100).  
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For the purposes of this exposition, the derision characteristic of ranting can be 
understood as any attack on subject x (be it in character, competence, background or 
physical appearance), or any verbal denigration of subject x that takes the form of 
ridicule, teasing, threatening, swearing or cursing (ah, the double entendre), as well as 
indirect denigration of subject x, such as with sarcasm. DiCioccio (2012) explains that 
“ironic messages, such as sarcasm” have been associated with “trait verbal 
aggressiveness” and “are potentially more hurtful than direct attacks” (p. 99). It is also 
worth noting that Infante et al. (1984) group nonverbal emblems directed at subject x into 
the verbal aggressiveness category; this grouping is due to their explicit reference to a 
verbal meaning. For example, the meaning behind sticking your middle finger up at 
someone in this culture is translated as, “fuck you” – so the act, while nonvocal in nature, 
is still viewed as verbal, insofar as there is a specific verbal meaning associated with the 
nonverbal emblem.  
The conceptual definition of ridiculous I take to mean extremely silly or absurd, 
and contend that the “ridiculousness” characteristic of the rant should be interpreted both 
nonverbally, in terms of the ranter’s facial expressions, body movements, appearance and 
artifacts, use of space, use of touch, vocalizations and voice qualities (Alberts, Martin, & 
Nakayama, 2011), as well as in relation to both the verbal justification that the ranter 
provides and the derision that the ranter directs toward subject x. Admittedly, it is a much 
trickier endeavor to operationalize this qualification of the rant, for two reasons. First, 
unlike the other characteristics of substance, this qualification references, at least 
partially, the form of the rant; the extent to which a rant is ridiculous is partially due to its 
incessant, impulsive and explosive form. Keeping this in mind, the researcher is again 
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confronted with the problem of operationalizing an opinion-based term. The extent to 
which one denotes anything as “ridiculous” is largely dependent on their personal bias – 
just as the extent to which someone devotes “too much time” to something is also 
arguably subjective. As a result, it is best to think of the ridiculous in terms of its negative 
relationship with social propriety; i.e.: what are some common expectations associated 
with acceptable vs. non-acceptable expressions of emotions of or related to anger? In a 
similar vein, what makes some justifications and some derisive language absurd or at the 
very least, outside of the ordinary? Furthermore, is denigration every really justifiable? 
The answer to all of these questions is yes – when it is ridiculous and doesn’t cause harm 
to the audience – i.e.: when it is humorous. This may seem like circular reasoning, but 
answering yes to these questions is supported by the incongruity theory of humor 
(Berlyne, 1960), which Meyer (2000) sites alongside superiority theory as one of three 
different approaches to humor in communication.  
Frymier & Houser (2012) explain that, 
According to incongruity theory, humorous reactions result from exposure to 
stimuli that are unexpected, shocking, or surprising (Berger, 1976; Berlyne, 1960; 
McGhee, 1979). A basic premise behind this theory is that people enter 
communication situations with a specific set of expectations and when something 
happens unexpectedly, it is often perceived as funny (p. 217)  
To get at the meaning behind the ridiculous or the absurd by viewing it as outside the 
dominant conception of ordinary or acceptable behaviors (both verbal and nonverbal) 
assumes that the interpreter understands what is expected in given communication 
situations, and thus what would be perceived as the opposite - as the ‘unexpected, 
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shocking, or surprising.’ In other words, the interpreter recognizes social propriety, and 
understands appropriate verbal and nonverbal behaviors in particular situations. If you’ll 
concede to the notion that I’m not a sociopath, I’d say that makes me qualified to 
interpret the ridiculous. Furthermore, ridiculousness can also be deciphered by 
juxtaposing the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the ranter. For example, if the ranter is 
ranting about “sluts” but their fly is down and their underwear is unknowingly on display, 
that qualifies as ridiculous, too. Table 3, Entitled “Humorous Rant (HR.) Substance” 
provides conditions for both the verbal and nonverbal operationalization of the substance 
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the form of 
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the object of scorn; 
adorning oneself 
with incongruous 
attire/ artifacts that 
contradicts the 
subject matter being 
discussed, or is 
unexpected. Ex: 
ranting about sluts 
while doing naked 
yoga; wearing a 
winter hat inside or 
during a non-winter 
season, etc. 
Table 3. Humorous Rant (HR.) Substance 
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Thinking of the ‘ordinary,’ ‘acceptable,’ or ‘expected,’ in terms of typical or ‘day-
to-day’ interactions with people also involves differentiating between personal 
relationships and professional or role relationships, since expected communication 
behaviors differ based on the relationship that the ranter has with a person. Personal 
relationships include ones developed with family, friends and in many cases coworkers, 
while professional relationships pertain to people you may see daily, but whom you 
exchange money or goods with for a particular service  - interactions with the grocery 
attendant or the postal worker or the restaurant server can be grouped into this category. 
What is interesting about parsing personal relationships from professional ones is that 
instances of live ranting would then only be acceptable in personal communicative 
situations – especially since the subject matter of the rants considered herein focuses on 
taboo-breaking or obscene sexual behavior. Again, ranting is conceived here as directed 
toward a particular person or class of people who are ignoble in their conceptualization of 
sex, or in their proceedings of sexual acts, according to the ranter.  
Since I have differentiated ranting from humorous ranting by denoting that the 
humorous rant is “ridiculous,” it seems that humorous ranting exists safely only when the 
witness has a personal relationship to the ranter, since the person ranting must manage 
not to offend the witness. Indeed, it is cringe-worthy to imagine a scenario where an 
orator is justifiable in their derision of x yet offends the witness in the process due to their 
inability to determine in advance whether or not their derision will offend the witness. 
However, it is a much easier endeavor to offer up denigration of x that may be offensive 
to some in a digital space as opposed to a physical one. The description of the form and 
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substance of the comedic rant vlog (CRV) offered below highlights this difference, and 
many others, between HRs and CRVs. 
According to Burgess & Green (2009), the vlogger (in this instance a YouTuber 
who rants via vlog) bridges the professional amateur divide with their recorded comedic 
rant vlogs. As a result, uploading a video blog on YouTube must also be seen as a 
rhetorical act, with its own motivations and exigencies; in fact, the exigencies and social 
action of making the video take precedent over the choice to rant within the video. 
YouTube is also a content aggregator; while it is true that many vlogs uploaded are ‘user-
generated content,’ a large percentage of the content on YouTube is professional, and 
available for access due to YouTube’s functioning as a search engine for popular video 
content (Stiegler, 2009). Since I have chosen to focus on the video blog, and more 
specifically, the comedic rant vlog (CRV), it is necessary to point out an additional 
function of the YouTube platform; that is, that YouTube users utilize the platforms 
available tools also as a social networking site, or SNS. 
According to Ellison and boyd (2013), YouTube can be characterized as a SNS. 
These researchers define a Social Networking Site (SNS) as: 
a networked communication platform in which participants 1) have uniquely 
identifiable profiles that consist of user-supplied content, content provided by 
other users, and/or system level data; 2) can publicly articulate connections that 
be viewed and traversed by others; and 3) can consume, produce, and/or interact 
with streams of user-generated content provided by their connections on the site 
(p. 158) 
Since uploading a video blog to YouTube requires that the vlogger has an uniquely 
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identifiable profile (in the form of a YouTube channel), and allows the vlogger to both 
publicly articulate connections that can be viewed or traversed by others and interact with 
streams of user-generated content, vloggers who choose to connect and interact in this 
manner are treating YouTube as a social networking site. What is interesting and unique 
about the YouTube channel as a profile is that Ellison and boyd (2013), in discussing the 
“public or semi-public profile” characteristic of SNS(s), explain that “Lacking visible 
bodies, self-presentation in online spaces offers participants many possibilities to actively 
construct a representation of how they would like to be identified” (p. 153); and yet, in 
the case of YouTube video blogging, there is no lack of ‘visible body.’ Instead, the 
YouTube vlogger showcases their body, their ‘live’ self, through an audiovisual 
recording. That being said, vloggers still choose how they will look, where they will film, 
what they will say, and how to edit their rants into a (semi) coherent narrative – one that 
may even be scripted - though with ranting, the oral expression must at least appear not to 
be. Since serial vloggers use YouTube as an SNS, the act of ranting, filming and editing 
the rant vlog, and subsequently posting a vlog on YouTube, can be understood as a genre 
of the YouTube platform – one that arises out of the ‘objectified social need’ to develop a 
public profile, or an online persona. Admittedly, this restricts the sample of video blogs 
considerably, as only comedic rant vlogs uploaded by serial vloggers will be considered 
(where ‘serial’ means occurring in regular installments, such as with a television series or 
newspaper periodical). 
Any generic rhetorical act is a combination of form and substance that arises due 
to social motive (Miller, 1984), so the rhetorical act of recording a vlog of oneself should 
be understood as being comprised of a particular form – in this case a video in 
	   81	  
confessional style format – and a particular substance. The substance of CRvV includes 
both the form and substance of the oral expression of the rant(er) outlined above, as well 
as the setting of the video, and any other additions that occur outside the oral expression 
of rant narrative that the vlogger might incorporate. These additions take many different 
forms; I have described some possible add-ons under the heading “Substance of the 
CRV” below. Based on the understanding of the vlog as an ‘emblematic form’ of the 
YouTube platform (Burgess & Green, 2009), the next task is to operationalize the form 
and substance of the CRV. 
Form of the CRV 
Since comedic rant vlogs are recorded, and thus easily duplicated, the easiest way to 
illustrate the aspects of the object that constitute the form (aside from describing the 
thing) is to show you some representative examples of vlogs in confessional-style format. 
Figures 2, 3, and 4 are all screen shots of serial vloggers engaged in CRvV. Figure 2 
showcases the most popular vlogger of the three, Jenna Marbles, with over 15 million 
subscribers. The still was taken from a rant video entitled “People that I Hate” just over a 
year ago. Figure 3 is a still from the first vlogger I was ever exposed to – Kingsley – and 
is taken from one of his very first vlogs. Figure 4 is a screen shot of a less popular 
vlogger – one that never quite reached celebrity status, but still managed to go viral with 
one video. Her name is Krissychula, and she generally utilizes a slightly different 
approach to vlogging than the former two vloggers, in that she positions herself closer to 
the camera and often forgoes the editing process.  
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Fig. 2. Jenna Marbles, “People That I Hate.” 
From this image of JennaMarbles, we get a visual representation of confessional-style 
format on YouTube, or the ‘audio-visual one-to-one presentation of the self’ described by 
Simonsen (2012). This camera shot is known as the medium close-up; half way between 
the close-up and the medium shot, it generally encompasses a person’s head, shoulders, 
and the top portion of their chest (Barker, 2000). Recall that Burgess and Green (2009) 
described vlogs as produced, for the most part, with nothing more than a ‘webcam and 
some witty editing,’ and claim that the emblematic form has antecedents in the 
confessional culture of reality television. It is this aspect of the form, the ‘confessional 
culture,’ that is significant as an organizing principle; the format of the video creates in 
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the audience a feeling of immediacy. The audience feels close in proximity to the vlogger 
– it is as though the viewer has a “first-hand” experience of the vlogger’s personal 
emotions (despite whether or not these emotions are ‘authentic’ or ‘performed’ – a point 
of contention in reality television also – and significant in developing a persona, either 
online or via reality television).  
Werner (2012) claims that vlogging “can transform personal emotion into public 
spectacle, and even into powerful public statements” (p. 65). The still below is an 
example of the rant as a public spectacle, and showcases a second popular vlogger: 
Kingsley. Admittedly, this video does not come directly from Kingsley’s channel, but is 
uploaded by another YouTuber. In one of Kingsley’s many vlogs, he explains that 
someone hacked his channel, deleting many of his previous posts; this probably accounts 
for its absence on his own channel. Regardless, you can see here that the medium close-
up characteristic of confessional style format is again present in this vlog: 
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 Fig. 3. Kingsley, “Things I Hate” 
 
Another interesting aspect regarding the naming of ‘confessional-style’ format is that it 
intimates catharsis in the moniker. A “confession” in the Catholic sense purges the 
symbol-using animal of their sins, and here we have the dominant format of the vlog 
being described in form as a type of confession. The closeness in proximity of the 
vlogger to the camera actually creates a feeling of intimacy, or nearness – one that 
mirrors the physical distance that would typically be characteristic of live ranting – and 
thus also mirrors the (assumed) relationship between the ranter and the witness. Werner 
(2012) cites an interview with anthropologist Patricia Lange and a YouTube vlogger 
named Michelle, explaining that the “power and popularity of vlogging” is a result of 
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confessional style format’s ability to emphasize emotional performance, and “particularly 
emotion displayed on ‘somebody’s face’” (p. 70). 
 Another aspect of the form of the CRV that must be discussed is the salience of 
editing characteristic of many serial vloggers. Both of the videos referenced above 
contain multiple edits, which are evidenced by a quick frame change (better-known as the 
“jump-cut” in film studies) that is designed to be somewhat seamless. Many serial 
vloggers utilize editing as a tool to create a coherent or semi-coherent narrative. In terms 
of CRvV, by editing their rant together piece by piece, vloggers are able to give the 
appearance of a ‘feverish pacing’ that Werner (2012) discusses in his characterization of 
the rant, and thus the monologue appears to be both impulsive and incessant, despite it 
being highly formulaic. So in the case of comedic rant vlogs that have been edited, 
utilizing this tool actually also contributes to the manner in which the performance of the 
rant mirrors the criteria of the oral expression of the rant outlined above.  However, not 
all CRVs are edited. One example of a vlogger who doesn’t edit all of her rant vlogs is 
Krissychula. Figure 4 is a screen shot of one of her vlogs entitled “Double Standards,” 
that contains no presence of edits.  
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Fig. 4. Krissychula, “Double Standards” 
Here, the camera positioning is slightly different. This shot can be characterized more as 
a close-up; the shot only includes the face and the top of her shoulders, and the bottom of 
the frame rests on her shoulders as opposed to her bust line. This shot is slightly different 
from the medium close-up referenced in the previous two videos. Interestingly, 
Krissychula has the fewest followers of the three vloggers featured here. Her channel also 
has substantially fewer videos, and those videos have substantially fewer edits (with 
some, such as “Double Standards,” subject to none at all). These observations might 
inform future studies that examine whether or not number of edits per vlog is positively 
correlated with popularity – though I am off-track for the purpose of this exposition.  
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Either way, I wanted to include an example of a less popular vlogger as well, since I have 
only limited the corpus of vlogs thus far by contending that they must include rant 
performance and be a result of a serial vlogger. Table 4, entitled “Comedic Rant Vlog 
(CRV) Form,” provides criteria for the form of the CRV. 







Creates a feeling of 
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focusing on facial 
expressions.  
Generally comprised 
of a medium close-up 
shot taken at the bust 
line - the vlogger’s 
face and partial torso 
included in the 
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close-up (Barker, 
2000), though this 
type of shot is less 
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both the aural and 
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Table 4. Comedic Rant Vlog (CRV) Form 
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Substance of the CRV  
Miller (1984) would argue that the substance of the comedic rant vlog must 
include the form and substance of the humorous (live) ranting outlined above. This 
insistence falls in line with O’Hallaran (2011), a researcher who developed a way to treat 
television shows as a semiotic resource by adapting Norman Fairclough’s Critical 
Discourse Analysis to televisual texts, a methodology she termed Multi-Modal Discourse 
Analysis (MDA). O’Hallaran (2011) identified three points of inquiry that comprised the 
overall “discourse” present in the program: “spoken language, kinetic features (including 
gaze, body posture, and gesture) and cinematography effects (including camera angle and 
frame size)” (p. 127). My approach also includes these points of inquiry, though 
cinematography effects are hierarchical to spoken language and kinetic features based on 
Miller’s paradigm. This all makes sense, since the form of the vlog mirrors traditional 
approaches to television (recall that Burgess & Green (2009), referenced reality television 
and talk shows specifically), but what else constitutes the substance of the CRV? What 
are some additions to the CRV that occur outside of the form and substance of rant 
performance?  
Possible supplements to the oral performance of the rant might include an oral 
preface, delivered by the vlogger, as to why they’ve chosen to rant about a particular 
topic – this is especially the case when the choice to rant was based on viewer demand. 
The vlogger will often precede the rant performance with a declaration that they are 
ranting about a particular topic due to their followers’ insistence that they do so. Other 
added visual information might include pictoral images, perhaps even with added foley. 
One such type of these audiovisual add-ons serves as the vlogger’s signature; introducing 
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each video in the corpus of texts uploaded by the vlogger, the supplemental image (either 
accompanied by sound or devoid of sound) is the first phenomena that a viewer 
encounters upon clicking on a particular video, and indicates that this particular video 
belongs to a particular vlogger. Figure 5 is a still of the signature that occurs at the 
beginning of Jenna Marbles’ vlogs:  
 
 
Fig. 5. Jenna Marbles - Signature 
It is not always the case that serial vloggers have a signature, though it seems to be 
common, again, amongst popular serial vloggers. Continuing on with additional types of 
substance characteristic of the CRV, it could be the case that a vlogger has added typed 
text to a vlog in post-production, or that they utilize a portion of the screen (while 
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engaged in rant performance) to simultaneously show pictures of the thing they are 
deriding; theses images serve as a type of visual aid to the denigration offered via rant 
performance. Furthermore, since the oral expression of the rant occurs in a particular 
space that is evidenced within the frame, the setting, or background, where rant 
performance occurs must also be included as an interpretable aspect of the substance of 
the CRV. Peters and Seier (2009) in discussing identity construction on YouTube via 
home dance videos, argue that,  
While the focus is solely on the performance of the actors, the framing of the 
images reveals much more: the room décor thus supplements the video. This 
supplementary aspect of the image in turn forms the aesthetic surplus of the 
YouTube video. (p. 193) 
As a result, it would be ill-informed to omit this aspect of the video, as the setting in 
which the vlogger films is also a deliberate choice, and should be interpreted as such. 
Table 5 below, entitled “Comedic Rant Vlog (CRV) Substance,” provides criteria for the 
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typed text; pictures 
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portion of the 
screen, etc. 
No 
Setting of the 
video 
The place where the 
ranter performed the 
rant 
The background of 
the video – the 
visual information 
that we can gather 
from the frame that 
doesn’t include the 
ranter’s body; room 
décor (Peters & 
Seier, 2009). 
Yes 
Table 5. Comedic Rant Vlog (CRV) Substance.  
 
What is interesting about vlogs (since video blogs are partially comprised in 
substance of monologues as opposed to dialogues) as a stylistic device is that vlogs may 
either take the form of actions or reactions; in other words, monologues might be a 
response to a particular person or persons (when a politician responds to a question in a 
political debate, for example), but they may also be preplanned, as with a lecture or a 
sermon or some such other action that is not dialogic in nature. Since comedic ranting via 
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vlog is a prolific and recurring act on YouTube, and may be viewed by some as both an 
action and a reaction in the same package (due to a major portion of its substance being 
rant performance), interpreting CRVs requires “more elaborate rule structures.” My 
contention is that CRVs are a deliberate act – I do not view them as reactive, at least not 
in the sense that I view live ranting. But just because CRVs aren’t strictly emotional 
reactions to subject x, it doesn’t mean they aren’t dialogical reactions. They’re just not 
dialogical reactions in the sense that a dialogue is created within the object of analysis.  
The dialogue that emerges occurs in the rhetorical situation in which the vlog is 
manifest (in this case, YouTube). Many popular vloggers post rant vlogs at the behest of 
their audience. For example, Jenna Marbles’ vlog posts entitled, “Reading Mean 
Comments” and “People that I Hate,” posted on January 15th 2015 and December 10th 
2015 respectively, are videos that she made due to an overwhelming demand from her 
fans. In the latter video (a rant), she prefaces the diatribe by explaining, “You guys are 
always asking me, like, “Hey Jennahh, make a rant,” like you’re essentially saying, 
“Jennaaahhh, we want you to shit on people!”(Mourey, 2015). While the act’s substance 
still involves the vlogger shitting on x, this vlog rant was made based on viewer/ follower 
insistence; though the substance of the vlog is still a monologue, it is a dialogical reaction 
(based not on a need to purge, but on a need to please). Throughout the rant, 
JennaMarbles rants about a range of different people that she hates for different reasons, 
and does so in a ridiculous manner. This is an intentionally humorous rant performance: 
she indicates that she has made a rant to entertain the demand of her followers, and since 
she has close to 16 million subscribers on YouTube, this makes her a professional 
comedian – hence the naming of the object of analysis as comedic rant vlogs as opposed 
	   93	  
to humorous rant vlogs. 
 As discussed previously, in order to intentionally rant in a humorous manner (one 
that does not offend the witness), the vlogger most likely has developed a personal 
relationship with the witness; they know the witness well enough to understand what may 
be offensive to them, and what may not be. In the case of YouTube vlogging, however, 
the situation is different – the vlogger must rely on comments, vlog views, and other 
feedback to determine whether or not their CRV will offend people, and even taking as 
much information into account as they can, the vlogs they upload don’t please everyone. 
This idea and others will be discussed in the culminating chapter of this exposition. 
For serial vloggers, the mediated rant is a way to build a public persona, or online 
identity. Through the act of making a vlog and uploading it to the YouTube platform, 
vloggers build a loyal following and celebrity status. This is the main difference between 
‘live’ ranting, inspired by bottled up anger, and ‘performative’ ranting, inspired by the 
drive to gather followers. The amount of planning, production, and delay between CRvV 
and viewer reception makes asynchronously mediated rants a mere imitation of live 
humorous ranting. I would also argue that those rants subject to edits mirror most closely 
the act of live ranting; since edited CRVs emphasize the ‘feverish pacing’ of the rant by 
suggesting that the ranter is persistent in their vehement expression of emotions of or 
related to anger, the viewer is challenged to keep up with the verbal incessancy, and 
perhaps doesn’t notice the fluid replacement of medium close-up shots succeeding one 
another that imitate the experience of live ranting. At any rate, the exigence of CRVs on 
YouTube must be understood as a way to build a public profile or online persona; truly, 
the vlogger intentionally constructs a cathartic experience for their viewers. However, the 
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authenticity of the emotions expressed is suspect, and so too is the idea that those who 
rant do so in order to purge – at least in the instance of CRVs, there is reasonable doubt in 


















































“Every now and then I have been accused of being crude and vulgar because I have used 
analogies of sex or the toilet. I do not do this because I want to shock, particularly, but 
because there are certain experiences that are common to all, and sex and toilet are two of 
them. Furthermore, every one is interested in those two - which can’t be said of every 
common experience” (Saul Alinsky, 1971, pp. 83-84). 
 
I began this body of work by posing a series of questions regarding the rant, in 
order to develop a richer understanding of the rant as a typology, and to situate ranting as 
a rhetorical genre that can be studied by examining its iterations on the YouTube 
platform. RQ1 asked: What criteria must a rhetorical act meet in order to be considered a 
rant? How does the researcher distinguish “the rant” from other rhetorical genres? My 
attempts to understand ranting as a rhetorical act (preceded by an authentic emotional 
response to a given situation), have lead me to the conclusion that live ranting may not 
actually be a genre, at least not by Miller’s (1984) conceptualization. Despite its 
recurrence as a trans-historical act, the situations in which ranting occur don’t have to 
share many commonalities; ranting doesn’t recur due to ‘an objectified social need,’ so 
much as it arises out of a universal human need to purge. The reiterative form of the rant 
is based on an understanding of how people have previously purged emotions of or 
related to anger in monologue form, sure, but the urgent need to release these emotions 
can be viewed in the same light as the urgent need to expel waste. Indeed – explosive 
diarrhea is less of a social response to a recurrent social situation, and more of an action 
engaged in due to the absence of an alternative. However, the manner in which one 
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should purge (and where to do it), and the manner in which one should not (and where 
not to do it), are also understood. In other words, just as one can’t “drop trou” anywhere 
if they feel an excremental urge, as that would be inappropriate, it is not proper to rant in 
every situation. Differentiating rant typology from rant genre addresses the ongoing 
difficulties with developing and delineating rhetorical genres – particularly those based in 
ever-evolving oral traditions that are not subject to any legal formalities or stipulations 
Nevertheless, I developed a typology of ranting (R.) and humorous ranting (HR.), 
not only to describe ranting conceptually, but in order to operationalize the act as an 
interpretable text mediated by the body.  The description of HR. (again, humorous ranting 
is significant, since comedic rants vlogs imitate this type of rant) that outlines both what 
HR. is, and what it does, is as follows: HR. (humorous ranting) is an impulsive, incessant 
oral expression of heightened emotions of or related to anger - an emotive oral tradition 
wherein the orator devotes a relentless amount of time to denigrating subject x due to 
their heightened feelings regarding x, but spends perhaps less time than is necessary 
accurately articulating their rage in a calm, methodical manner. The ranter is both 
justifiable and ridiculous in declaring: “I vehemently disapprove of x,” (which effectively 
declares: “I am not x”), so the ranter’s use of humor constructs a cathartic experience 
for the audience. Insofar as the audience identifies with the ranter, the catharsis 
constructed culminates in laughter, and catharsis has been achieved.  
I developed this description as a necessary first step in analyzing iterations of 
ranting via the YouTube vlog; since comedic rant vlogs contain humorous rant 
performance, imitating an act that occurs ‘authentically’ means the researcher must first 
be able to describe that act in its original form. I did this by combining Burke’s 
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dramatistic pentad with his concept of catharsis, ultimately considering live ranting as a 
form of pure persuasion. That being said, the argument that humorous (live) ranting 
constructs a cathartic experience for the audience functions regardless of this 
consideration, since constructing a cathartic experience for the audience relies not on 
pure persuasion, but on the justifiable and ridiculous manner in which the rant is 
articulated.  
My second research question was designed to highlight the differences in form, 
substance, and social action that exist between HR. and CRvV. RQ2 asked: How might 
the ability to record and edit oneself within ‘confessional-style’ recordings (form) 
restructure the rant (in form and substance)? How might the affordances of YouTube 
contribute to restructuring the rant (in form and substance) via vlog (form) as a social 
action? Perhaps the most significant distinction between these two objects is that while 
CRVs can be considered a genre of the YouTube platform, as their exigence is easily 
identifiable, yet it is much more difficult to identify the social action behind HR. In fact, 
what makes this iteration of ranting a genre is its repeated and remediated performance – 
the planning and execution of something that is purportedly impulsive, incessant and 
explosive makes CRVs an imitation of HR. remediated via vlog.  
Miller would say that the social motive for posting YouTube vlogs is analogous 
for all serial YouTube vloggers. I have previously reasoned (based on Ellison & boyd’s 
[2013] definition of a SNS) that this similar social motive is to develop a public persona, 
or online identity. Despite a host of identifiable differences amongst the vloggers (race, 
gender, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, etc.), and the 
oral substance of the vlog (subject matter, i.e. the vlog rant vs. instructional vlogs; 
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emotional vs. rational performances, intentionally humorous vs. intentionally serious 
approaches), consistently vlogging accomplishes a social action, and that (is at the very 
least) creating a public profile.  
This methodology proposes studying serial vloggers that upload comedic rant 
vlogs, which means that a portion of the substance of the object of analysis ( the CRV) is 
an oral articulation that effectively declares, “I am not x;” it also means this oral 
expression must be justifiable and ridiculous in approach. Since serial vlogging is a 
deliberate process of uploading videos to the YouTube platform (designed to build a 
following), and making people laugh is one way to get recognition, the vlogger 
intentionally constructs a cathartic experience for the audience. Aristotle (Kennedy, 
2007), Infante et al. (1984), DiCioccio (2012), Meyer (2000) and Vrooman (2002), claim 
that directing insult at subject x makes one feel superior to x, and since YouTubers that 
engage in comedic vlog rant performance bridge the professional-amateur divide, I 
reason that CRvV grants the vlogger a powerful subject position; insofar as the ranter 
gains popularity through vlogging and vlog rant performance, their recognizability grants 
them celebrity status.  
Consider a quote from a serial vlogger mentioned previously: “I’m silly and fun 
because that’s just how I choose to see the world,” declares Jenna Marbles in her 200th 
video (Mourey, 2014). Interestingly, this video cannot be categorized as a vlog, as it 
includes no spoken language – the only sound the viewer hears is a song. The meaning of 
the video is created through a combination of the song, a montage of previous vlog clips 
and moments in Jenna’s life, and scrolling text at the bottom of the screen. At the end of 
the video, Jenna mouths “I love you” to the camera, right after the scrolling text reads, 
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‘but I give all the fucks about my life [break] and yours’ (Mourey, 2014). Here, Jenna 
Marbles identifies with her audience; by creating a public profile comprised of serial 
vlogs that not only declares (in the case of comedic vlog rants) who she is not – but also 
says, explicitly, who she is – or at least who she wants to be perceived as. Here, Jenna 
Marbles presents herself as a self-made comedian (‘I’m silly and fun’) who cares about 
her own life and the lives of her followers, and who shows her followers gratitude by 
creating a special video just for them.  This is an atypical object in the corpus of texts 
uploaded to JennaMarbles’ page, but it is worth mentioning. In conducting a rhetorical 
analysis of rant vlogs as a genre, researchers have the opportunity to obtain a much better 
understanding of the vlogger’s varied motivations; since serial vloggers develop a 
persona over time through recordings, the process of vlogging consistently results in a 
library of texts. Therefore, videos that the vlogger produces that are not vlogs, and even 
vlogs that are not considered rants, can be utilized to fill in the blanks about a particular 
vlogger’s personal intention, or social motive. In other words, non-CRVs uploaded by a 
particular vlogger can be used for supplementary information, though the methodology 
previously outlined should only be applied to CRVs.  
Being able to readily and easily access facts about the speaker that come directly 
from them, but are not provoked by any researcher, preserves the internal validity of the 
textual analysis while increasing the likelihood of a richly descriptive end product. It also 
provides further commentary on the notion mentioned earlier, that the ‘confessional-
style’ form of the vlog seems to be special in its ability to showcase emotions, providing 
the audience with a window into the true personality of the vlogger. This idea that the 
confessional form gives us a glimpse of authentic human emotions (due to the viewer’s 
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ability to get “up-close and personal” to the vlogger via camera positioning) is significant 
in considering the alternative social actions that CRvV may accomplish. The confessional 
format gives the audience a sense of “now-ness,” but since rant performance is recorded, 
altered (in many cases), and uploaded, the comedic rant vlogger is actually at an 
advantage, as they can “get emotional” about a topic, but present those emotions in a 
much more rational narrative than a live ranter. Likewise, the ability to edit a vlog grants 
the ranter more power in constructing a coherent message, and enables more succinct 
justification, seeing that the rant is planned. Live ranters lack tools, such as editing, the 
ability to script a rant, and the ability to review a rant before presenting it  - all of which 
work to ensure that the message delivered via CRV is lucid. 
RQ3 asks: Considering the conclusions on media form and rhetorical substance 
from RQ2, how might the researcher go about applying the method? Might other social 
actions arise upon further investigation?  Well, in terms of applying the method, the 
researcher must begin by identifying the object as a vlog. Since form is the way in which 
substance is articulated (Miller, 1984), the researcher, in considering whether or not the 
object meets the criteria, must first ask: does the object meet the conditions outlined in 
Table 4: Comedic Rant Vlog (CRV) Form? This essentially means first determining 
whether or not the recording is an ‘audio-visual one-to-one presentation of the self’ 
(Simonsen, 2012); as long as the camera positioning is a medium close-up or close-up 
that focuses attention on the vlogger’s face, and the vlogger is the only person speaking 
into the camera, then the object is a vlog. The vlog may also be edited, though edits do 
not have to be present. The next question to ask is: does the vlog meet the criteria 
outlined in Table 5: Comedic Rant Vlog (CRV) Substance? Here, the researcher should 
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start by ensuring that the oral performance indeed meets the criteria for HR., which 
involves looking to the verbal and nonverbal operationalization of both the form and 
substance of HR.  
Just as the researcher begins by ensuring that the case aligns with vlog form, so 
too must the researcher begin addressing this portion of the substance of the vlog by 
ensuring that the oral performance in the CRV aligns with the verbal and nonverbal 
operationalization of humorous (live) ranting. Since HR. is an act within the CRV that 
foregrounds the substance of the CRV, HR. is subject to its own form and substance. 
When addressing the ‘lower level’ of the ‘hierarchy,’ form is the chief organizing 
principle (Miller, 1984). The researcher must first ask of the case – given that this is a 
vlog, does the oral performance within the vlog meet the criteria outlined in Table 2: 
Humorous Rant (HR.) Form? If the answer is yes, the next question becomes: does the 
oral performance meet the criteria outlined in Table 3: Humorous Rant (HR.) Substance? 
Providing that it does, the researcher can ensure that the remaining required aspect of 
CRV (setting) is present, in order to settle on a particular case as the object of analysis. 
This is what a preliminary application of method to object might look like. I have chosen 
another vlog from JennaMarbles for this task, entitled: “Things I Don’t Understand 
About Girls Part 2 Slut Edition” (Mourey, 2013). Though she has removed this vlog from 
her personal channel, I archived it before she did – as did Maria Caliente (a YouTube 
user). You can still access the video on YouTube; typing the title into the YouTube 
search bar still grants access to the video - it just happens to be uploaded by someone 
else.  
Either way, I start by determining that this object (or act), meets the criteria 
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outlined in Table 4, Comedic Rant Vlog (CRV) Form; this simply entails determining 
whether or not the camera positioning is comprised of a medium close-up shot taken at 
the bust line - the vlogger’s face and partial torso included in the frame. While this shot 
can also be a close-up (Barker, 2000), close-up shots are less common to the form, and 
Jenna Marbles tends to utilize the medium close-up. Figure 6, entitled: “Things I Don’t 
Understand About Girls Part 2 Slut Edition” is a still from that video: 
 




The researcher can at this point determine the presence or absence of editing as well, 
though editing does not necessarily have to be present in a CRV. This particular video 
contains many edits, which aid in message construction, particularly since the substance 
of the CRV is foregrounded by an oral performance of the rant.  
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 In order to determine that the act contains an oral performance of humorous 
ranting, I turn to Table 5, Comedic Rant Vlog (CRV) Substance, which directs me to 
Tables 2 and 3 – HR. Form and HR. Substance, respectively. She begins the narrative 
within the vlog with a greeting: “Hey friends!” and a description of where she is speaking 
from – her dining room – where she is certain to point out the Spiderman cut-out behind 
her. She asks, “Do you have one of these in your dining room? Because I dooo – hashtag 
‘adult’” (Mourey, 2013). This greeting serves to establish Jenna as “silly and fun,” the 
way that she describes herself in her 200th video, referenced previously. It is 12 seconds 
long, and includes five visible edits. Since this “episode” is a part 2, she also prefaces the 
rant performance by explaining that the video is, “kinda gonna be more, like, some 
questions that I have for sluts,” since the last video was questions that she had about 
herself. In order to determine that the oral performance meets the criteria for HR. form, I 
first check to ensure the manner of speaking is impulsive, incessant and explosive. This 
involves assessing whether or not the verbal and nonverbal operationalization of these 
terms is present.  
Looking to Table 2, I determine that the oral performance appears to be 
impulsive, since 30 seconds into the beginning of the video she introduces the topic of 
her scorn: sluts. This is a sudden declaration of disapproval toward sluts, who she defines 
as “Someone who has A LOOOTTT of casual sex” (Mourey, 2013). She is also speaking 
quickly (aided by many edits that piece the narrative together), which gives the 
appearance of a ‘feverish pacing’ (Werner, 2012), and she widens her eyes in a show of 
disbelief when talking about ‘slutty’ behavior. Impulsive – check. The oral performance 
is also incessant – she repeatedly uses the word slut and provides multiple examples of 
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slutty behavior, appears to be “in-your-face” (a function of the confessional style 
recording), and repeats gestures of disbelief (throwing her hands up in the air, widened 
eyes) throughout the rant. The oral performance contains many “explosive” aspects as 
well. For example, at 4:03 (the video is over nine minutes long), she takes one particular 
slut as an example, explaining that the person in question (subject x) reasoned that her 
particular behavior was not in fact slutty because she engaged primarily in anal sex, or, as 
Jenna phrased it, “only did it in the butt.” Jenna Marbles’ reaction: “WHAT?! That is 
some stupid. fucking. logic, honey, like I can’t even, I-I have no response for that, that’s 
so stupid. I’m just completely baffled and dumb-founded by your slut logic that I-I-I got 
nothin’! You win!” Accompanying this vehement verbal disapproval is a heightened 
pitch (the “what” is exaggerated, as is “I got nothin’, you win”), her tone exhibits 
frustration, and she utilizes exaggerated hand gestures, such as throwing her hands out in 
front of her with palms facing upward, a gesture culturally understood as the “why?” 
gesture. She also repeatedly looks briefly to her right and then back at the camera, 
engaging in jerky and at times rapid or abrupt head/ eye movement. Now that the oral 
performance in the CRV has been classified as fitting HR. form, the researcher turns to 
Table 3, Humorous Rant (HR.) Substance, to ensure that the rant is justifiable, ridiculous, 
and derisive.  
Since meeting the first criteria for HR. substance simply requires that the ranter 
provide reasons for their vehement disapproval of subject x, I’d say the performance 
within this video qualifies. Immediately after Jenna Marbles deems having anal sex with 
multiple men “slutty” behavior, she mentions another type of “slutty” behavior that 
doesn’t involve anal intercourse. Explaining how other “sluts” say, “Oh no, you know I 
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would never sleep with him, I just like, sucked his DICK like a bunch of times. That 
doesn’t make me a slut because it didn’t go, you know…” Her reply: “I got news for you, 
if it goes in any hole in your BODY – your mouth, your butt, your vajay – you’re getting 
fucked! Mouth-fucked is a thing. It doesn’t matter that you didn’t sleep with any of them. 
Think about it” (Mourey, 2013). Here she provides justification for deeming this behavior 
“slutty,” clarifying that any girl that allows a “dick” to repeatedly penetrate an orifice is 
indeed a slut, regardless of where that orifice is located on the body. She points to her 
own pelvic region (off-screen) when explaining that just because “it didn’t go, you 
know…” it doesn’t mean that a person isn’t a slut. This mode of justification is also a 
form of indirect derision, since she sarcastically ridicules the “slut” who claims that 
engaging in fellatio “doesn’t count” on the gamut of slutty behavior, illustrating her point 
by gesturing toward her own, non-slutty vaginal orifice. Her sarcastic ridicule of subject 
x also involves swearing, and this combination of strong language, sarcasm, and 
illustrative nonverbal behavior makes the oral performance derisive. This particular 
instance of rant performance can also be characterized as ridiculous, since she employs 
over-the-top justifications – “if it goes in any hole in you’re BODY…then you’re getting 
fucked,” and is atypical in nature; she labels the vagina a “vajay,” repeatedly imitates the 
confessions of “sluts” from her past, and the combination of her language and behavior 
can be interpreted as ridiculous, insofar as this behavior can be described as unexpected 
or surprising. It is also out of the ordinary, since all the while the image of Spiderman in 
the background remains constant; this also qualifies as ridiculous, since there is an 
incongruity in subject matter and imagery. 
After determining that the oral performance of the rant meets some (or all) verbal 
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and nonverbal qualifications of HR., the researcher must return to Table 5, CRV 
Substance, in order to identify the presence of any post-production add-ons (which may 
be included but are not required), as well as to describe the setting of the video. The 
video begins with Jenna Marbles’ signature (see Fig. 5), as do all of her vlogs. This 
aspect of the rant substance is classified as a post-production add-on, since it occurs 
before she engages in rant performance, and also exists outside of the narrative. Her 
signature includes foley; the sound of a squeaky toy or clown prop or some other such 
silly artifact, repeated twice, accompanies the image. Likewise, I have already mentioned 
the setting of the video, or room décor - which is her dining room - and where almost the 
entire left side of the frame behind her (save some red wall space) is a giant cardboard 
cutout of Spiderman (featured in Fig. 6). Remember, a description of the setting must be 
present in interpreting CRVs, since this is part of the substance of the object, in addition 
to the oral performance of HR. 
If CRVs are edited, and this changes the form of the rant, does it also change the 
substance of the rant – i.e., do the emotions expressed become more rational – and thus 
more powerful? Well, I have already established that humorous rants directed toward 
subject x effectively declare: I am above x, according to the superiority theory of humor 
(Meyer, 2000; Infante et al., 1984). However, I believe there are two additional levels of 
elevation in CRVs. Andrejevic (2004) writes: “If the limelight that revealed the most 
personal and intimate details of celebrities’ lives demystified them, if it brought them 
“down” to the level of ordinary people, the corollary was that ordinary people could, 
through mass mediated self-disclosure, attain a degree of celebrity” (p. 67). Attaining a 
degree of celebrity is one possible social action that CRvV may accomplish; vloggers 
	   107	  
may elevate themselves from the “ordinary” to the “celebrated” in attaining celebrity 
status, but in doing so they also elevate themselves from consumer to producer 
(Bazerman, 2012, p. 27). This elevation, designed to combat the “top-down” consumerist 
model with user-generated content, is itself insidious. Before I get to consumerism, 
however, I want to spend a little bit of time talking about celebrity as a subject position. 
 I contend that vlogging creates a unique, and potentially powerful, subject 
positioning for the YouTube vlogger. What I mean by this is that, in serial vlogging, 
vloggers situate themselves in a position to attain celebrity status, which grants them 
more power in terms of social influence. If a video has 10 million views, I think its safe 
to say that close to 10 million people have seen it (although a single person might view 
the video multiple times, it is also the case that one “view” could have reached a number 
of people, if the video was played to a group, so this number can be said to be inexact but 
an accurate estimate nonetheless). In studying vlogs as meaningful texts, the researcher 
must consider the vlogger’s draw; if millions of people choose to watch a particular 
vlogger, then the vlogger reaches millions, and if the vlogger reaches millions then the 
vlogger has the potential to influence millions. This makes the messages they relay about 
particular topics, and the way that they present themselves through vlogs, important for a 
number of reasons. While any subject x can be the focus of a rant, considering rants rife 
with sexual subject matter places the researcher in a position to interpret the vlogger’s 
attitudes toward gender and sexuality (or at least to interpret the persona’s attitude, since 
we can’t necessarily equate the vlogger’s personal views with those of the ‘persona’ that 
delivers rant performance). This also carries implications for interpreting the hegemonic 
ideals associated with sex in a particular culture. Jenna Marbles’ next example of slutty 
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behavior in the aforementioned video quips, “Another thing I don’t understand about 
sluts is when a particularly promiscuous girl finally gets knocked u by some dude, she’s 
like, ‘Hey, isn’t everyone so excited for me isn’t this great I’m having a baby!” And 
we’re all kinda like, ‘I’m-I’m-I’m not excited, I don’t, do you-do you know who the dad 
is? Because I remember that time in college when like, the hockey team was running a 
train on you, so I feel weird – I bought you a bunch of baby stuff – heard you’re having a 
girl so I got you some pink shit but, uh, its not gonna stop me from feeling very strange 
about the whole thing’” (Mourey, 2013). This video had over 10 million views when I 
archived it in 2015. 
Foucault (1978) remarked that,  
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, 
any more than silences are. We must make allowance for the complex and 
unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of 
power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting 
point for an opposing strategy” (Foucault, 1978, p. 101). 
In order to understand how discourses might function as both “an instrument of power” 
and as “a point of resistance,” it is first pertinent to understand Foucault’s 
conceptualization of power, especially as it stands in opposition to the Marxist theory – 
since a discussion of how a vlogger elevates themselves from producer to consumer will 
follow.  
For Michel Foucault, languages are complex and dynamic organizing principles 
wherein the relationship between knowledge and power form a union; it is through 
language that the citizens of a society come to understand the existing power dynamic. 
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Put differently, discourse denotes and delineates “force relations” so that members of 
society can position themselves within society and understand their position within these 
force relations (p. 92). Since vloggers are members of society that have the ability to 
reach millions of people, and since they are also providing a cathartic experience for the 
audience by justifiably and ridiculously directing impulsive, incessant, and explosive 
insult at subject x, AND since their rant performance also attracts followers who 
‘subscribe’ to the vlogger’s public persona, we can understand the vlogger’s subscribers 
as ascribing, at least partially, to the viewpoints offered by the vlogger’s persona via 
vlog. The fact that knowledge and power are unified in, and articulated through, 
discourse, and that texts are produced (and reproduced) through particular speakers, 
situated within a specific time period and embedded in a particular rhetorical situation 
within a particular culture, paired with the fact that serial rant vloggers are actually 
reaching people (it is known – at least by advertisers), should be a concern for researchers 
in media studies and rhetorical studies alike. The term “follower” is often used to 
describe YouTube subscribers, as it used to describe Instagram connections, and 
Facebook has a function that allows users to choose who they will follow (i.e., what 
stories will show up in their newsfeed), and who not to. Perhaps this isn’t just a way to 
indicate connections, but also implies social influence. 
Corbett and Connors (1999) remind us that “Writers lack the advantage a speaker 
enjoys because of their face-to-face contact with audience and because of their vocal 
delivery; the only way in which writers can make up for this advantage is by brilliance of 
style” (p. 23). Studying the rant in not only an aural, but a visual context characterized by 
“immediacy” (confessional-style format makes nonverbal scrutiny of facial expression 
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unavoidable) offers more opportunity for the researcher to explore how vocal inflection, 
kinetics, setting, and editing contribute to the construction of heightened displays of 
emotion present in comedic rant vlog performance, and highlights the importance of 
considering a ‘proliferation of discourses’ by examining recordings as texts  - texts that 
provide much more information than mere language. Foucault’s (1978) initial objective 
in History of Sexuality: Volume 1 was to “to analyze a certain form of knowledge 
regarding sex,” and it is my contention that CRVs can be interpreted as describing some 
such forms.  
Future research might utilize the typology of the rant developed herein to examine 
how ranting online explicitly relates to A) more serious or dramatic performances of the 
rant, as well as B) performances of particular aspects of identity such as gender, race, 
socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, or any combination of the 
aforementioned categories. Johnson (2014) explains that, 
Social media exploration brings new complexity and possibility to what Erving 
Goffman (1959) coins “the presentation of self in everyday life. […] Because our 
identities fluctuate in a milieu of negotiation, conceptual change, and mediated 
representations, it is important to study how social media challenge the way we 
perform, authenticate, appropriate, and exploit intersectional identities. (p. 155) 
One such intersectional identity is race and sexuality. According to Williams, 
Tyree, and Lewis (2015), “Queering and transgendered practices were visible across the 
Internet since the emergence of multiuser domains (MUDs) and have permitted those 
with access to the technology to make choices in how they present themselves to the 
mass public” (p. 106), and they go on to explain that YouTube is a platform where “the 
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potential to mediate a sort of performative play” (p. 107) is realized. This all seems great 
for counter-acting dominant ideologies regarding gender performance and attitudes 
toward sexuality – but there is a catch. Williams, Tyree and Lewis (2015) studied one 
particular vlogger, Quentin Latham, commodified his online persona by placing a wig on 
his head and becoming an alter ego: “Funky Dineva” (p. 108). Funky Dineva is a 
comedic vlogger who identifies as a black, homosexual man –one who uses incongruity 
theory to create ridiculous yet justifiable videos, though they are not necessarily rants.  
This case study emphasizes another social action that serial vlogging can 
accomplish: commodifying the online identity created through serial vlogging. While it is 
true that Funky Dineva, and many other serial vloggers, often appear in other media in 
order to further their celebrity status (they are featured on talk shows, attend award 
shows, and make guest appearances on other vlog channels, etc.), the fact remains that 
vloggers who go viral or obtain celebrity status, and even less well-known vloggers that 
may not be characterized as internet “celebrities,” get paid to vlog on YouTube. Burgess 
and Green (2009) explain that this is possible through “the company’s revenue-sharing 
program, which extends a cut of the revenue from page views to prominent producers 
who create their own content” (p. 97), but there are other opportunities to commodify a 
persona. Vloggers may post links to YouTube videos on other SNSs (Facebook, 
Instagram, Vine, etc.) in order to increase notoriety; they might be paid by certain 
companies independently as well, if the vlogger agrees to advertise their product. 
Although his work focuses on reality television, Andrejevic (2004) explains that 
participatory cultures don’t necessarily combat top-down consumerism:  
The celebrity status attained by participants on the show highlights the promise 
	   112	  
that authentication via surveillance has its tangible rewards…  This is a promise 
that needs to be handled very carefully. On the one hand, it invokes a familiar 
critique of a society in which authentic individuality has been subordinated to the 
dictates of mass production and the mass media […] As labor power before it, 
personal information can be extracted from consumers only to be sold back to 
them in a congealed commodity form. This ambivalence in the promise of mass 
customization recapitulates an oft-noted ambivalence in the political potential of 
new information technologies in general. (p. 111) 
My theory is that vloggers who are granted access to YouTube’s revenue-sharing 
program have gained celebrity status by reinforcing or celebrating hegemony. 
Considering Butler’s (1986;1988) theory of performativity, I hypothesize that: those 
vloggers who challenge heteronormativity have a difficult time attaining celebrity status, 
while those vloggers who adhere to hegemonic ideals are more likely to attain celebrity 
status. Put differently: In the case of serial vloggers, attaining celebrity status is positively 
correlated with adherence to heteronormativity. Jenna Marbles is a prime example – in 
the application outlined above, she effectively claims that only heterosexual “girls” 
engage in slutty behavior, defines slutty behavior as allowing a “dick” to penetrate an 
orifice, and suggests that promiscuous women should not be excited about having 
children. Nowhere in this nine minute rant does she acknowledge homosexuality, 
reinforcing Butler’s assertion that gender performativity is organized around explicitly 
heteronormative ideals (Butler, 1993). But at least she’s still being supportive, right? 
You’re having a girl? I bought you some pink shit. Thanks Jenna, for reminding us that 
female babies should be restrictively adorned with pink shit. 
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The question as to whether or not vlogging may be an opportunity for vloggers to 
reinforce or subvert traditional notions of heteronormativity then becomes a question of – 
does attaining celebrity status mean that a vlogger has commodified their persona, and 
how have they done this, and in the process of doing this, did they challenge 
heteronormativity or reinforce it? These questions and others will inform my future 
research. 
 
Vloggers choose how they will look, where they will film, what they will say, and 
how to edit their rants into a (semi) coherent narrative. Might the progress achieved by 
the marriage equality movement in Western North America be evidence of a proliferation 
of discourses surrounding this “unnatural” (Foucault’s terminology) marginalized 
population? How does YouTube, as a social networking site, proliferate discourses that 
originate from the standpoint of “the resistance”? How do they assimilate them? Since 
vlogs are texts as well, should we be concerned about this presentation of the self that 
relies on emotive performance? When do the lines between “authentic” and “performed” 
emotions start to become blurry? Ng and Kidder (2010) explain that, "Cultural meaning 
is implicated in one’s performance of emotion. The emotive self is on display in the 
course of social interactions…Seldom does a person resort to meaningless rants... at the 
height of a so-called emotional outburst" (p. 197). Since we understand emotional 
expression in a cultural context, what can we learn from rant performance exported in 
other media?  
The choice to discuss sexuality as a topic of social significance specific to rant 
genre is a merger of my academic and personal interest in the field of gender and 
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sexuality studies on the one hand, and the assertion that the subject matter of rants often 
reflects a “focus on things sexual, especially things that might be considered taboo 
breaking or obscene” (Vrooman, 2002, p. 57). Additionally, expressing sexuality and 
performing gender identity are pertinent topics of discussion in the cultural context of 
contemporary U.S. proceedings, particularly in the wake of two significant and highly 
publicized occurrences: Caitlyn Jenner’s cover story on Vanity Fair, published online in 
its entirety on June 25th, 2015 and the Supreme Court ruling on June 26th, 2015 that 
legalized marriage for same sex couples in the United States. And since Campbell and 
Jamieson (1978) explain, as so many other rhetoricians have, that, “Because rhetoric is of 
the public life, because rhetorical acts are concerned with ideas and processes rooted in 
the here and now of social and political life, rhetoric develops in time and through time” 
(p. 22), it is important to examine the common themes that have arisen over the past 40 or 
so years since Foucault wrote his History of Sexuality: Volume 1, if only to examine how 
a proliferation of discourses, in various texts, may have functioned to create positive 
social change (admittedly, this is an idea that Foucault himself would probably reject).  
My light-hearted and at times, intentionally humorous, approach to the subject 
matter outlined herein is inspired by Kenneth Burke. If what Crusius (1999) says of 
Burke’s philosophy is true, if the approach to saving ourselves is to adopt a “comic 
attitude,” if “In part, the point of Burkean Comedy is to transcend of transmute our 
irritation, frustration, and anger with ourselves, other people, and social institutions by 
becoming interested in them” (p.199), then if nothing else, I hope I have fueled your 
interest in comedic ranting via vlog. 
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